Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It
Table of Contents
Preface
The Tobin Project
Introduction
Daniel Carpenter, Freed Professor of Government, Harvard University
David Moss, John G. McLean Professor, Harvard Business School
SECTION I: FAILURES OF CAPTURE SCHOLARSHIP
1. A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture
William Novak, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School
2. The Concept of Reglatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History
Richard Posner, Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School
3. Detecting and Measuring Capture
Daniel Carpenter, Freed Professsor of Government, Harvard University
SECTION II: NEW CONCEPTIONS OF CAPTURE: MECHANISMS AND OUTCOMES
Section Introduction
4. Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis
James Kwak, Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law
5. Complexity, Capacity, and Capture
Nolan McCarty, Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
6. Preventing Economists' Capture
Luigi Zingales, Robert C. McCormack Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance and David G. Booth Faculty Fellow, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
7. Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation
Daniel Carpenter, Freed Professor of Government, Harvard University
SECTION III: MISDIAGNOSING CAPTURE AND CASE STUDIES OF REGULATORY SUCCESS
Section Introduction
8. Capturing History: The Case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927
David Moss, John G. McLean Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School
Jonathan B. L. Decker, Associate, Ropes & Gray LLP
9. Conditional Forbearance as an Alternative to Capture: Evidence from Coal Mine Safety Regulation
Sanford Gordon, Associate Professor of Politics, New York University
Catherine Hafer, Associate Professor of Politics, New York University
10. Captured by Disaster? Reinterpreting Regulatory Behavior in the Shadow of the Gulf Oil Spill
Christopher Carrigan, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Administration, The Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration, George Washington University
11. Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking
Susan Webb Yackee, Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Political Science, La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison
12. Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Professor of Law and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School
SECTION IV: THE POSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING CAPTURE
Section Introduction
13. Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation
Daniel Schwarcz, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School
14. Courts and Regulatory Capture
M. Elizabeth Magill, Dean and Richard E. Lang Professor, Stanford Law School
15. Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?
Richard Revesz, Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law, New York University Law School
Michael Livermore, Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
Conclusion
David Moss, John G. McLean Professor, Harvard Business School
Daniel Carpenter, Freed Professor of Government, Harvard University
Afterword
Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senator (D-RI)
James Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanitities; Former Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (R-IA)