|
Edited by Daniel Carpenter (Harvard University) and David Moss (Harvard Business School) To receive a notification when the book is published, email us. “We aspire to improve our understanding of capture, making it more rigorous, more thorough, and more practically useful to those who want to prevent capture. Capture is real and a genuine threat to regulation, we recognize, but regulation to protect and advance the public interest is both possible and necessary.” - "Introduction" to Preventing Capture: Special Interest Influence in Regulation, and How to Limit It |
SummaryRecent crises in (de)regulated industries – most notably, the financial system’s collapse, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and the 2006 West Virginia mine disaster – have made it clear that regulation is both necessary and, in many cases, in need of significant improvement. The Tobin Project is working on an edited volume, Preventing Capture: Special Interest Influence in Regulation, and How to Limit It, that employs a broad set of methodological tools and rigorous evidentiary standards to identify regulatory successes and failures in recent American experience, as well as the conditions that foster success rather than failure. The purpose of the work is not only to clarify capture theory and its limits, but also to provide a positive contribution to the understanding of regulation and how best to safeguard it from undue influence. The project aims to offer cutting-edge analysis of capture, its limits, and possibilities for preventing undue (and deleterious) influence in regulatory settings. Working Drafts of Chapters:Introduction PDF SECTION I: FAILURES OF CAPTURE SCHOLARSHIP1. A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture Theory PDF 2. Detecting and Measuring Capture PDF 3. The Concept of Reglatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History SECTION II: NEW CONCEPTIONS OF CAPTURE: MECHANISMS AND OUTCOMES4. Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis PDF 5. Preventing Economists' Capture 6. Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation PDF 7. Complexity, Capacity, and Capture PDF SECTION III: MISDIAGNOSING CAPTURE AND CASE STUDIES OF REGULATORY SUCCESS8. Capturing History: The Case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927 PDF 9. Accidents and Enforcement at the Mine Safety and Health Administration PDF 10. Minerals Management Service and Deepwater Horizon PDF 11. Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking PDF 12. Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law PDF SECTION IV: THE POSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING CAPTURE13. Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation PDF 14. Courts and Regulatory Capture PDF 15. Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?
Conclusion PDF |