Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It
Edited by Daniel Carpenter (Harvard University) and David Moss (Harvard Business School)
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The Tobin Project is pleased to announce that Cambridge University Press will be publishing Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It(ed. Dan Carpenter and David Moss), a volume which grew out of the Tobin Project's Preventing Capture initiative. The draft chapters are now available for free download until the published volume becomes available for purchase in late 2013.
This volume brings together a set of authors from a range of disciplines who carefully examine contemporary regulation to gain a clearer grasp of what regulatory capture is, where and to what extent it occurs, what prevents it from occurring more fully and pervasively, and, finally, to distill lessons for policymakers and the public for how capture can be mitigated, and the public interest protected.
The volume has been recognized by an independent reviewer as “one of the most important interventions yet in the discussion underway regarding regulatory capture.”
When regulations (or lack thereof) seem to detract from the common good, critics often point to regulatory capture as a culprit. In some academic and policy circles it seems to have assumed the status of an immutable law. Yet for all the ink spilled describing and decrying capture, the concept remains difficult to nail down in practice. Is capture truly as powerful and unpreventable as the informed consensus seems to suggest? This edited volume brings together seventeen scholars from across the social sciences to address this question. Their work shows that capture is often misdiagnosed, and may in fact, be preventable and manageable. Focusing on the goal of prevention, the volume advances a more rigorous and empirical standard for diagnosing and measuring capture, paving the way for new lines of academic inquiry and more precise and nuanced reform.
Table of Contents
SECTION I: FAILURES OF CAPTURE SCHOLARSHIP
2. The Concept of Reglatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History
3. Detecting and Measuring Capture
SECTION II: NEW CONCEPTIONS OF CAPTURE: MECHANISMS AND OUTCOMES
4. Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis
5. Preventing Economists' Capture
6. Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation
7. Complexity, Capacity, and Capture
SECTION III: MISDIAGNOSING CAPTURE AND CASE STUDIES OF REGULATORY SUCCESS
8. Capturing History: The Case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927
9. Conditional Forbearance as an Alternative to Capture: Evidence from Coal Mine Safety Regulation
10. Captured by Disaster? Reinterpreting Regulatory Behavior in the Shadow of the Gulf Oil Spill
11. Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking
12. Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law
SECTION IV: THE POSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING CAPTURE
13. Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation
14. Courts and Regulatory Capture
15. Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?