Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It
Edited by Daniel Carpenter (Harvard University) and David Moss (Harvard Business School), Cambridge University Press, 2013
Cambridge University Press book page here.
Table of Contents
SECTION I: FAILURES OF CAPTURE SCHOLARSHIP
2. The Concept of Reglatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History
3. Detecting and Measuring Capture
SECTION II: NEW CONCEPTIONS OF CAPTURE: MECHANISMS AND OUTCOMES
4. Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis
5. Complexity, Capacity, and Capture
6. Preventing Economists' Capture
7. Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation
SECTION III: MISDIAGNOSING CAPTURE AND CASE STUDIES OF REGULATORY SUCCESS
8. Capturing History: The Case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927
9. Conditional Forbearance as an Alternative to Capture: Evidence from Coal Mine Safety Regulation
10. Captured by Disaster? Reinterpreting Regulatory Behavior in the Shadow of the Gulf Oil Spill
11. Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking
12. Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law
SECTION IV: THE POSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING CAPTURE
13. Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation
14. Courts and Regulatory Capture
15. Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?
“’Regulatory capture’ is an often used, little understood term. It is quoted frequently by those who would like to question a regulation for any of a number of agendas without an effort to understand the science or reason behind it. Daniel Carpenter and David Moss and the co-authors have written a long overdue analysis of the issue and what, when proven true, can be done about it."
– Christine Todd Whitman, former governor of New Jersey and former head of the Environmental Protection Agency
“This is an enormously useful collection that goes beyond alleging and lamenting regulatory capture to provide diagnostic tools for evaluating purported instances of captured regulatory regimes and institutional techniques for avoiding their emergence and mitigating their effects.”
– Jerry Mashaw, Yale University
“This collection deftly sharpens our thinking about the nature of regulatory capture. It compiles the most multidimensional treatment we have of capture and the American regulatory state.”
– John Braithwaite, Australian National University
When regulations (or lack thereof) seem to detract from the common good, critics often point to regulatory capture as a culprit. In some academic and policy circles it seems to have assumed the status of an immutable law. Yet for all the ink spilled describing and decrying capture, the concept remains difficult to nail down in practice. Is capture truly as powerful and unpreventable as the informed consensus seems to suggest? This edited volume brings together seventeen scholars from across the social sciences to address this question. Their work shows that capture is often misdiagnosed, and may in fact, be preventable and manageable. Focusing on the goal of prevention, the volume advances a more rigorous and empirical standard for diagnosing and measuring capture, paving the way for new lines of academic inquiry and more precise and nuanced reform.