“How can we make America safe?”

We recently posed this question to eleven leading scholars of foreign policy and national security. Their responses, contained in this volume, advocate a broad strategy that combats terrorism on all fronts—not only on the battlefield—and that directs our resources toward the unique threats of the post-9/11 era. Such a strategy would, at a minimum, accomplish five key objectives:

- Prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons
- Arrive at an endgame in Iraq
- Spread democracy and win the war of ideas
- Finance and fight a broader war on terror
- Manage the rise of great powers

These papers suggest that our nation’s current national security strategy is deeply flawed and that a new approach is urgently needed. Together, the papers contain the main elements of this new approach.
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How to Make America Safe

New Policies for National Security

PAPERS FROM THE TOBIN PROJECT’S NATIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP

EDITED BY STEPHEN VAN EVERA
The papers in this volume were written by members of the Tobin Project’s National Security Working Group.

The Tobin Project brings together leading academics and policy makers to develop new ideas that will strengthen America.

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Introduction

How to Make America Safe:
New Policies for National Security

In order to win the war on terror and make America as safe as it can be, a new national security strategy is required. The seeds of such a strategy are evident in the latest works of eleven of the nation’s most eminent national security scholars. They envision a broader war, which combats terrorism on all fronts—not just with military force—and directs our resources and energy toward the gravest threat we face: nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. As our experiences in Iraq have shown, our current strategy is fundamentally ill-suited to fighting the type of conflict in which we find ourselves.

Addressing a nation at war in January, 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt declared, “This war must be waged—it is being waged with the greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at stake. Everything we are and have will be given.”

Five years after 9/11, Americans need little reminding of what is at stake in today’s struggle against terrorism: There remains today the significant possibility of catastrophic destruction—even a nuclear attack—on American soil, which could leave hundreds of thousands of Americans dead, many more injured, and literally billions around the world vulnerable to the global economic meltdown that would likely ensue.

Americans understand the gravity of the terrorist threat we face. They are right to wonder, “Is everything we have being given?” Amidst reports of porous ports, loose nukes, a nascent civil war in Iraq, rising incidence of global terrorism, and nuclear saber rattling in Iran and North Korea, it is no surprise that they are asking whether our current national security strategy is really up to the monumental task of making America safe.
We posed this question to eleven American scholars of national security. Although they do not agree on every point, their responses point toward a clear conclusion—that a new plan of action is urgently needed to protect Americans from the historically unique threat posed by international terrorism. All eleven scholars suggest that the assumptions underlying the current strategy are, by and large, relics from a bygone era, poorly suited for the purpose of defeating terrorism.

The old model, in which our current national security strategy is rooted, focuses mainly on states, which field standing armies that can be defeated on the battlefield. It presumes that the greatest threats to America will come primarily from two sources: rogue states, including those that support terrorism, and potential competitors among rising great powers, most notably China. The current strategy emphasizes regime change as a solution to the threat posed by the former; and to deter the latter, it insists upon dedicating the vast majority of America’s national security resources to defense systems used for conventional combat between states, not hunting down terrorists.

Of course, the possibility of a hostile great power threatening America in the future cannot be ruled out, and rogue states do present a real danger. But today, most rogue actors are not states. Our most deadly foes now are stateless terrorists, and the gravest threat we face is the possibility that weapons of mass destruction might fall into their hands. Indeed, there is a remarkable degree of consensus among national security scholars concerning the primacy of this specific threat. What is needed is a national security strategy that acknowledges the rise of non-state actors and that unleashes the totality of American assets—military, intelligence, domestic security, diplomatic, economic, and ideological—in our defense. Any such strategy must pass a simple test: Does it minimize the possibility that a catastrophic attack will occur on American soil?

By that standard, our current national security strategy is both inadequate and misguided. Nothing illustrates its deficiency better than the defining foreign policy event of the current administration: the war in Iraq. Opponents of the war often describe it as a distraction from the war on terror. But more than that, our strategy in Iraq is a microcosm of the limitations of the current approach to national security as a whole.

Rather than standing out merely as an isolated, unfortunate blemish on the administration’s national security record, our failures in Iraq illustrate why the current approach is fundamentally incapable of winning
the war on terror. As several of the papers in this volume suggest, the overarching fault with the war in Iraq has been the administration’s conviction that our most important national security objectives require little more than crushing the armies of opposing states on the battlefield—that once conventional victory is won, all else falls into place.

That mindset has contributed significantly to most of our problems in Iraq—from the inability to police the country, to the inadequate economic reconstruction effort, to the ongoing insurgency, to the dearth of competent administrators, to the lack of support for our mission among Iraqis and others around the world. Our Iraq experience shows that defeating opposing armies, no matter how swiftly and decisively, will not by itself produce overall victory. In order to win the war on terror, we must also succeed in precisely those areas in which we have failed in Iraq: public diplomacy, economic development, building local political institutions, strengthening local security institutions, developing good intelligence on adversaries, waging counter-insurgency. Sadly, those are tasks our current approach to national security quite deliberately relegates to the periphery.

When our presence in Iraq comes to an end, it would be a major mistake to blame our difficulties there solely on incompetence or bad planning. The lessons we should learn from Iraq are ones of strategy, not merely of execution. Unless we adopt a fresh strategy in the broad struggle against terrorism, it is likely to end up resembling the war in Iraq. And with the lives of 300 million Americans at stake, that is a frightening prospect.

What would a fresh strategy look like? To fully address the menacing threat currently being neglected, a new foreign policy must accomplish five key objectives:

I. Prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the long term, America’s goals must be to kill or capture the terrorists who are committed to attacking America and to dry up the sources of recruitment for terrorist groups. But that objective will take years to achieve. In the short term, we must do everything in our power to make it impossible for terrorists to gain possession of nuclear weapons. As Graham Allison explains, the continued failure to do so constitutes the single greatest and most alarming defect in our current national security strategy. It is also a somewhat perplexing problem to have: the steps needed to secure nuclear
weapons and fissile material from terrorists are affordable and attainable ones. Moreover, there seems to be virtual unanimity among U.S. leaders that nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat currently facing the nation.

Part of the difficulty is a lack of funding, but according to Matthew Bunn, a more serious problem is a lack of leadership on the issue. Due to the political and bureaucratic hurdles associated with securing nuclear material, little is likely to be achieved without sustained attention to the problem from the highest levels of government. What is required of America’s leaders, therefore, is a dogged determination to make combating nuclear terrorism their number one national security priority—period.

Allison’s framework of No Loose Nukes, No New Nascent Nukes, and No New Nuclear Weapons States is a useful guide for policymakers. We must speed up the process of locking up nuclear weapons and fissile material in Russia and elsewhere so that this goal is achieved swiftly. In addition, we must renew our commitment to supplementing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with new measures that broaden IAEA inspections and close the existing treaty’s loopholes.

Similarly, Robert Gallucci argues that the primary objective of our Iran and North Korea policies must be to prevent them from developing fissile material that, given their respective histories, could potentially fall into the hands of terrorists. To achieve this end, we must be willing to enter into direct negotiations with both of these states. The Bush administration’s ambiguous, incoherent stances toward Iran and North Korea are inexcusable. Its preoccupation with regime change—in Vice President Cheney’s words, “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it”—reflects its belief that the Cold War proved that odious regimes can and must be defeated, not merely contained. This is, however, precisely the wrong lesson to draw from the past sixty years of American foreign policy. Negotiations can indeed be a legitimate and effective means of keeping America safe, if we enter with a clear stance and both carrots and sticks, including a credible military option. Had President Kennedy insisted on regime change as our only option during the Cuban Missile Crisis, one shudders to think what might have happened. As repugnant as these states’ leaders are, our long-term desire for regime change must yield to our overarching goal of preventing the annihilation of an American city.

II. Arrive at an endgame in Iraq. The sad fact is that there are no appealing options for solving the problems facing Iraq. Yet, given the immense continuing cost in lives and dollars that the U.S. is incurring there, any
honest national security strategy must give a clear account of what one proposes to do in Iraq. Simply asserting that we will stay the course until victory is not an answer. Victory is defined vaguely at best, and, in light of the armed conflict erupting between Iraqi Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, is likely not achievable militarily no matter how effectively our troops fight.

Barry Posen, who was among the prescient few to note in Fall 2005 that a civil war was already brewing in Iraq, recommends that the U.S. publicly commit to a withdrawal date in mid-2007. Doing so would give Iraqis both the time and the incentive to prepare themselves for the transition, forcing Iraqi factional leaders either to reach a power-sharing agreement (likely devolving the bulk of power upon regional governments) or, tragically, to face an escalating civil war. In the long term, the U.S. should maintain a meaningful military presence in the region to combat any al-Qaeda operatives remaining in Iraq and to ensure that any conflict there does not spread outside Iraq’s borders. When one weighs the immense cost of the ongoing deployment in Iraq, the significant harm being done to the morale and fighting capability of our armed forces, and the public relations boon our presence there gives to our enemies in the fight for hearts and minds in the Islamic world, maintaining current troop levels in Iraq for the indefinite future is simply unacceptable.

The deliberate disengagement of U.S. ground forces from Iraq, though the best of the available options, is admittedly less than satisfactory. The reason, it should be made clear, is that the administration’s handling of Iraq over the past three-plus years has brought us to such a point. We find ourselves boxed into a corner in Iraq because our current national security strategy is simply ill-suited to the current world in which we live. The only way to succeed, in Iraq and elsewhere, is to recognize that it is time to implement a new strategy.

III. Spread democracy and win the war of ideas. The current administration deserves credit for certain elements of its assault on terrorism: it has pursued al-Qaeda leaders, deprived them of their valuable operations base in Afghanistan, and taken out much of their command-and-control structures. Such successes have likely played a critical role in preventing another terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11.

But attacking the terrorists directly is only part of the strategy necessary for ultimate victory in the war on terror. We must also deprive terrorists of their ideological sympathizers by aggressively combating the jihadist narrative and improving our standing in the Islamic world.
As Stephen Van Evera points out, the administration has evinced almost no interest in bolstering America’s public diplomacy effort. Al-Qaeda’s propaganda trumpeting a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West cries out for a response, yet often goes unchallenged. The war in Iraq has certainly done harm to our ability to convince mainstream Muslims to join the fight against fundamentalist terrorism. America’s failure to push strongly for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, as well as other conflicts in places like Chechnya and Kashmir, allows al-Qaeda to continue feeding off of wars between Muslims and non-Muslims. No one denies that drying up al-Qaeda’s recruitment and sympathy is a key component of the war on terror—yet our current national security strategy places surprisingly little emphasis on it.

Daryl Press and Benjamin Valentino second the call for improved public diplomacy, and argue more generally that America is using the wrong mix of tools to counter the new challenges from non-state and weak-state actors. In the long run, they assert, ensuring American security in an age of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction requires a new grand strategy to help restore America’s image abroad. This strategy uses military power when necessary—for example, to target terrorists who seek to harm Americans—but it relies on non-military tools to achieve America’s other important foreign policy goals, such as spreading democracy and encouraging free markets. They advocate reducing U.S. military presence in hostile regions like the Persian Gulf because those deployments provoke attacks against the United States by disaffected groups or governments and make the U.S. the central target for the rage of Islamic militants and other extremist groups.

In addition, the U.S. should follow up on the Bush administration’s rhetorical commitment to spread democracy by increasing aid for building democratic institutions—including a free press, an independent judiciary, and a vibrant civil society—as well as promoting free markets and responsible governance. In a war in which failed states and social disorder pose at least as great a threat as dictators and tyrants do, we must pay as much attention to helping societies develop as we do to defeating our enemies on the battlefield.

IV. Finance and fight a broader War on Terror. Over the past five years, national security spending has increased by more than 50 percent in real terms. Unfortunately, as Cindy Williams documents, much of that is
being spent on the equipment used to fight yesterday’s wars—ships, fighter planes, and missile defense technology helpful in a war with the Soviet Union but of limited use in the fight against al-Qaeda. Despite some institutional shifting, funding for homeland security, diplomacy, and international economic and military aid is still dwarfed by massive new defense spending, much of it for Cold War-type defense systems and the war in Iraq. Astonishingly, the 2006 budget spends more on missile defense than on port security, anti-biowarfare medical research, and first responders combined. Appropriations for research into new technologies that might be better suited to the war on terror have not been increased, and the administration’s widely touted Millennium Challenge Account to promote economic growth in the developing world remains underfunded. Van Evera notes that the problem is getting worse: the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, apparently eyeing potential future conflicts against well-armed state powers, called once again for spending huge sums on equipment designed primarily for organized combat on the battlefield.

While it is essential that the United States retain its decisive conventional military superiority, our national security budget must be brought in line with our priorities: no expense must be spared in the struggle against al-Qaeda and its allies, even if it means building marginally fewer new-generation submarines or tactical fighters. If the war on terror is to be fought on all fronts, our national security budget must reflect that reality. Fortunately, relatively small reallocations of funds, if spent wisely, can go a long way toward making America safer by improving homeland security and striking at the roots of terrorism—politically, economically, and militarily.

Dan Byman lays out a plan for fighting a more effective war on terror. He commends the current administration for scoring several important successes, especially in terms of its military and intelligence efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, but argues that in terms of diplomacy, homeland security, and especially the war of ideas, more needs to be done. Byman recognizes that there are trade-offs between some of our goals—for instance, strengthening the counterterrorism capacity of certain states may hamper democratic reform there—but suggests that the war on terror should at times take precedence, even as we strive to build democratic institutions and strengthen pro-U.S. voices in the Islamic world.
V. Manage the rise of great powers. In order to keep America safe for decades to come, a new national security strategy must include a blueprint for managing relations with established great powers and incorporating ascending ones—most notably China and India—as responsible leaders of the global community. Rapid growth in these two countries has the potential to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. At the same time, there is the possibility that the rise of these powers—particularly China, which shows few signs of improving its human rights record and liberalizing its political system—could pose a threat to international peace and stability.

To bring China and India successfully into the liberal world order, we must steer clear of both premature confrontation on the one hand and shortsighted accommodation on the other. Joseph Nye contends that those who are determined to treat China as a likely adversary run the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that could have painful consequences for all parties. Our own history clearly illustrates that the emergence of a new power need not result in conflict, particularly if the potential rivals share a commitment to common principles. Certainly, America’s rise to world power status at the close of the nineteenth century did not prompt war with Britain or France. Although the historical and philosophical ties between the U.S. and China are not as deep as those we had with Britain and France, it would be short-sighted and counterproductive to sow the seeds of enmity simply out of a belief in the inevitability of future conflict. Nye warns against exaggerating the Chinese threat, suggesting instead that we maintain our policy of engagement while prudently hedging against the possibility that China’s re-emergence on the world stage might not go as smoothly as we would like.

In a similar vein, Edward Steinfeld dispels some of the popular myths surrounding China’s rapid economic growth in recent years. He notes that China is not the controlled, well-organized mercantilist machine it is often described as. China’s growth has not been the product of strategic top-down policies implemented by the government in Beijing; instead, it has been driven largely by foreign (especially American) investment, decentralized entrepreneurs, and local government officials operating outside the country’s legal framework. The result has been uneven growth—spectacular in some areas, dismal in others—that has caused massive disruptions in Chinese society, which officials in the central government are only now starting to recognize. Steinfeld contends that rather than decrying China as an economic threat, we should
work with the Chinese when possible to smooth the global economic, environmental, and geopolitical consequences of the country’s frenzied development.

In the case of India, Gallucci identifies a rather different problem: giving too much deference to a rising power with little benefit in return. The deal reached earlier this year between the U.S. and India threatens to undermine the credibility of the international nonproliferation regime, which has served as a cornerstone of global security for decades. In our quest for better relations with rising powers, the U.S. cannot abandon key components of the international system we have helped build up over the course of the past sixty years. Instead, we should chart a consistent, principled middle course that seeks to engage China and India without appeasing them. Doing so will minimize the potential for future conflict and allow the U.S. to focus on the more immediate and dire threat—terrorism—while enlisting the aid of as many states as possible in that struggle.

Today’s new dangers pose a common threat to all major powers, and they cannot be defeated without common action among them. Stephen Van Evera calls for a new concert of cooperation reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, when in 1815 Europe’s powers worked together to fight what they perceived as a common threat. Van Evera suggests that such cooperation is possible in our own era. Nuclear weapons have made conquest among great powers impossible, and the competition for security that fueled intense conflict among them has abated. Far less dangerous to each other, today’s great powers can and must make common cause to address the most pressing global threats.

The current administration would have us believe that we are fighting the war on terror as vigilantly and aggressively as possible. It is becoming increasingly clear that that is not the case. Though we have achieved several notable successes, we are fighting the war with one hand tied behind our back. Some of our greatest resources—international legitimacy, democratic ideals, economic assistance, national security spending, technological innovation—are not being sufficiently leveraged. Some of the gravest threats we face—the spread of fissile material, proliferation among rogue states, inadequate port security, the drain on our resources caused by the ongoing conflict in Iraq—are not being addressed adequately.
In this new struggle, we must appreciate and implement the real lessons of the Cold War: military might is a critical and necessary key to victory, but not a sufficient one. The Cold War could not have been prosecuted nearly as effectively without the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the United Nations. It was won in large part because the U.S. presented the world with a far more attractive set of ideals than the Soviet Union did. Military force was always an option and was used when needed, but in tandem with the other elements of American power.

What the U.S. needs now to win the war on terror is an all-fronts, more-urgent-than-ever plan to defeat our enemies, secure the homeland, and win hearts and minds. That is, unfortunately, something that our current national security strategy, which makes outdated assumptions, spends money inefficiently, and incorporates the wrong lessons from America’s past, can never be. The new paradigm suggested by these papers is one that is tough, intelligent, comprehensive, and forward-looking. It recognizes that the threats we face today are so severe that they must be met, as FDR promised, with everything we have and everything we are.

This introduction was prepared by Stephen Van Evera, David A. Moss, and Mitchell Weiss with the assistance of Josh Patashnik. Stephen Van Evera is a Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Chair of the Tobin Project’s National Security Working Group. David A. Moss is the John G. McLean Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School and Founder of the Tobin Project. Mitchell Weiss is Director of the Tobin Project. Josh Patashnik is an undergraduate at Harvard College and a Research Assistant at the Tobin Project.
American politics may be deeply polarized, but there appears to be virtual unanimity about what constitutes the greatest threat to our national security. When asked that question during the first presidential debate of 2004, Senator Kerry’s immediate answer was, “nuclear proliferation,” because “there are terrorists trying to get their hands on that stuff.” President Bush concurred: “I agree with my opponent that the biggest threat facing this country today is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network.”

That assessment was buttressed by the 9/11 Commission’s official report, which documented in chilling detail Al Qaeda’s search for nuclear weapons. The report concluded, “Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target.” In August 2001, for instance, during the final countdown to what Al Qaeda calls the “Holy Tuesday” attack, bin Laden received two key former officials from Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program at his secret headquarters near Kabul. Over the course of three days of intense conversation, he and his second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, quizzed Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed about chemical, biological, and especially nuclear weapons. Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and the two other as yet unidentified, top-level Al Qaeda operatives who participated in these conversations had clearly moved beyond the impending assault on the World Trade Center to visions of grander attacks to follow.

The threats do not stop at Al Qaeda. Islamist websites reveal growing interest in nuclear bombs as weapons of jihad. “An Encyclopedia for the Preparation of Nuclear Weapons,” has begun appearing in the virtual
training library of some jihadist websites. No matter how much or how little the author knows about nuclear physics, the title, “The Nuclear Bomb of Jihad and the Way to Enrich Uranium,” makes clear that intent is not the missing ingredient to a nuclear terrorist attack.

Yet, distracted by Iraq, political scandals, and hurricanes, the U.S. government has failed to take the steps required to dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. As recently as December 5, 2005, the members of the 9/11 Commission, operating with private funding to follow up on their official mandate, gave the administration and Congress a “D” for their efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD. As the Commission Chairman Thomas Kean noted, “the size of the problem still totally dwarfs the policy response.”

What has happened while the administration’s attention has been diverted to the Iraq War? In the past three years, North Korea has reprocessed enough plutonium for eight nuclear bombs, restarted its Yongbyon reactor where it is producing enough plutonium for two additional bombs a year, and has thus crossed a line President Bush has repeatedly declared would be “intolerable.” It has even threatened to sell weapons to others including terrorists. Defying the U.N. Security Council’s demand that it suspend uranium enrichment-related activity at Isfahan and Natanz, Iran is accelerating its program and making threats to “wipe Israel off the map.” Once Tehran completes its industrial-scale facilities for producing highly enriched uranium, we face the nightmarish prospect that it might transfer nuclear weapons to its terrorist client and collaborator, Hezbollah, a group that has already killed 260 Americans in attacks in Lebanon and at Khobar Towers. In addition, research reactors in forty developing and transitional countries still hold the essential ingredient for nuclear bombs.

A nuclear terrorist attack on an American city would be a world-altering event. The gravity of the potential consequences requires that policy-makers give absolute priority to this challenge. The largely unrecognized good news is that nuclear terrorism is, in fact, preventable—preventable by a feasible, affordable checklist of actions.

The strategic narrowing is preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or the materials from which weapons could be made. If this choke-point can be squeezed tightly enough, we can deny terrorists the means necessary for the most deadly of all terror acts. As a fact of physics: no highly enriched uranium or plutonium, no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism. It is that simple.
A strategy for pursuing that agenda can be organized under a Doctrine of Three No’s: No Loose Nukes, No New Nascent Nukes and No New Nuclear Weapons States. On all three fronts, the Administration’s first-term performance can be summed up by one word: unacceptable.

No Loose Nukes requires securing all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, on the fastest possible timetable, to a new “gold standard.” Locking up valuable or dangerous items is something we know how to do. The United States does not lose gold from Fort Knox, nor Russia treasures from the Kremlin armory. Washington and Moscow should jointly develop a standard and then act at once to secure their own nuclear materials. Russian President Vladimir Putin must come to feel this in his gut as an existential threat to Russia. Moscow must see safeguarding those weapons not as a favor to the United States but as an essential protection for its own country and citizens.

With Putin aboard, the U.S. and Russia should launch a new “Global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.” Its mission would be to lock down all weapons and materials everywhere and clean out what cannot be locked down. This would require engaging the leaders of other nuclear states on the basis of a bedrock of vital national interest:

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prevent a nuclear bomb from going off in my capital. The global clean-out of at-risk nuclear material must be accelerated to finish the job in the next 12–18 months.

**No New Nascent Nukes** means no new national capabilities to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. A loophole in the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty allows states to develop these capacities as civilian programs, withdraw from the Treaty, utilize equipment and know-how received as a beneficiary of the Treaty, and proceed to build nuclear weapons. The proposition of no new nascent nukes acknowledges what the national security community is just beginning to realize: highly enriched uranium and plutonium are bombs just about to hatch.

The crucial challenge to this principle today is Iran. Preventing Iranian completion of its nuclear infrastructure will require a combination of enticing incentives and credible threats to persuade Tehran to accept a grand bargain for denuclearization. The U.S. should engage Iran in direct negotiations in coordination with a six-party complement that includes the EU3 and Russia. The U.S. threatens what Iran’s leadership worries about most: regime change—President Bush’s announced goal in his declaration of the “axis of evil.” Despite American difficulties in reconstructing a post-Saddam Iraq, Iran’s leaders took note of U.S. military capabilities that destroyed in a mere two weeks their most hated and feared adversary. President Bush should be prepared to give Tehran a security assurance that the U.S. will not attack Iran to change its regime by force as long as it complies with the terms of a moratorium on nuclear enrichment activity and permits intrusive IAEA inspections. These inspections must exceed the Additional Protocol to assure that the moratorium is observed not only at Isfahan and Natanz, but everywhere in Iran.

The partners should bring to these negotiations all the carrots the international community can reasonably provide Iran. These include a formal Iranian-E.U. agreement for significantly increased trade and investments; the opportunity to purchase additional civilian nuclear reactors from Russia (Iranian plans call for ten over the next decade); assured supply of fuel for nuclear reactors from internationally-supervised suppliers as proposed by IAEA Director, Mohamed Elbaradei, to include Russia, the E.U, the U.S., and a special IAEA-controlled “reserve of last resort” against the extreme contingency that supply of fuel were
to be interrupted for noncommercial reasons; spare parts from the U.S.
for Iran’s aging aircraft; an opportunity to buy new Airbus aircraft from
Europe; the beginning of negotiations with the WTO about membership;
and a commitment to six-party talks about Iran’s larger security con-
cerns and those of the region. This package could also include an offer
by the U.S. to open its embassy in Tehran and allow the Islamic Repub-
lic to open an embassy in Washington and to begin discussion about nor-
malization of relations.

Carrots alone, however, will not suffice. Crucial to sealing this deal
will be a judgment by Iran’s leaders that they have no realistic prospect
of enriching uranium at an industrial scale. Essential to that judgment is
a credible military threat to destroy the facilities before they can become
operational.

What remains for this deal to come together is for the U.S. to step up
as determined dealmaker, assemble the full array of international car-
rotes, and package a deal Iran cannot reasonably refuse.

**No New Nuclear Weapons States** draws a bright line under the current
eight nuclear powers and says unambiguously: “no more.” The urgent
test of this principle is North Korea, which now stands halfway across
that line. Preventing Pyongyang from becoming a “Nukes R Us” for ter-
rorists is the biggest challenge the international community faces in the
Asian arena.

In the case of North Korea, sharp internal divisions paralyzed the
first term of the Bush administration. As a result, it followed a policy of
insult and neglect, refusing to offer any carrots or threaten any sticks. In
Cheney’s words, “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”

Despite

the tough talk, however, the administration let the problem fester while
Pyongyang added to its arsenal.

In its second term, the Bush administration has made a much
stronger start on this agenda. The best hope for resolution starts with the
Joint Declaration at last September’s six-party talks in which North
Korea committed itself to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing
programs and return, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonprolifer-
ation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” Between those
words and the realization of this objective lies a long, steep road—every
step of which will be complex and contested. The first step must be a
North Korean freeze of its Yongbyon reactor and the associated repro-
cessing facility that is producing an additional two bombs worth of plutonium annually. Persuading Kim Jong Il to take even this step has so far proved impossible for the other members of the six-party talks.

Between North Korea and Washington there is zero trust. Each believes it was cheated by the other in prior agreements, and the evidence supports both parties’ claims. Given this deep distrust, China is the state best situated to play a critical role. When China earlier interrupted the flow of oil to Pyongyang “for technical reasons,” North Korea’s response was swift and compliant. China will thus have to be a central actor in the design of a mini-step-by-mini-step process in which the other five members of the six-party talks provide benefits to North Korea for the freeze and ultimate dismantling of its nuclear weapons infrastructure.

From the outset, the six-party talks have been stalemated by the fact that the stated U.S. objective—collapse of the North Korean regime—is China’s worst nightmare. In China’s dominant narrative, it entered the Korean War to prevent a U.S.-allied government on its border with Korea. As a concession to China, the Bush Administration should subordinate North Korean regime change to stopping North Korea’s nuclear program. This should include an assurance that the U.S. will not station troops in North Korea in any circumstance. President Bush should make such a pledge immediately. The United States must demonstrate readiness to join in multi-national Chinese-led assurances that North Korea will not be attacked as long as it observes constraints on further production or export of nuclear materials, and begins small steps toward eliminating its nuclear arsenal.

With these carrots from the U.S., South Korean willingness to deepen economic relations and eventually reunify the Korean peninsula, and the economic and technical assistance Japan and China clearly have on offer, China should be able to persuade North Korea’s Kim Jong Il to freeze current nuclear activities.

In addition, the responsible members of the international community should articulate credibly a principle of nuclear accountability. States should be held accountable for nuclear weapons and nuclear material they produce. North Korea should be put on notice that any nuclear attack using a weapon or weapon built from fissile material that originated within its borders will be treated as an attack by North Korea and will be met with “a full retaliatory response.”
The “No New Nuclear Weapon States” piece of the challenge will be easier in the long run if the U.S. and other nuclear weapon states devalue nuclear weapons. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons legally requires nuclear-weapon states to make “good faith” efforts towards disarmament. Steps such as reducing the overall number of deployed warheads from their current levels, and forsaying new nukes including the so-called “bunker busters” would give the U.S., Russia, and the other nuclear haves greater credibility in building a global consensus around the Three No’s. Other lower-hanging fruit for legislators could include legislation to ban nuclear weapons testing for a 10-year period (if the CTBT proves too much of a stretch), and adopting the necessary laws so that the Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement can take effect in the United States. The U.S. would also have much greater moral authority to deal with Iran if Washington agreed to a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty—essentially reminding to world that if the U.S. has no need for new fissile material, then neither does Iran.

Preventing a terrorist nuclear attack on an American city is not an issue for Republicans or Democrats. As the nation has learned from Hurricane Katrina, when disaster strikes, citizens will ask what everyone with authority did—or failed to do. In an age when terrorists target civilians with acts of unprecedented destruction, preventing nuclear terrorism cannot be pushed off into the “too hard” category. All elected leaders must understand the agenda of actions necessary to prevent nuclear terrorism and continually drill down on tasks left unfinished. Politicians from both sides of the aisle must keep up the pressure on the president and his renewed administration to rise to this challenge.

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APPENDIX: ACTIONS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM

No Loose Nukes

*Actions Required for A-level Performance:*

- Make preventing nuclear terrorism an “absolute priority”
- Presidents of the U.S. and Russia and their national security teams must feel the *existential threat* to their nations
- U.S. and Russian leaders jointly develop a new “gold standard” to which all nuclear weapons and materials will be secured to assure no nuclear weapons or materials are stolen
- Personally pledge to each other that all nuclear weapons and materials on each president’s territory will be secured to the gold standard on the fastest technically possible timetable
- Appoint individuals of stature reporting directly to U.S. and Russian presidents as commanders in the war on nuclear terrorism
- Include leaders of other nuclear states in a new Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism (mission: to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism)
- Accelerate Global Threat Reduction Initiative to take back Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from both Soviet- and U.S.-supplied research reactors on fastest technically feasible timetable

No New Nascent Nukes

*Actions Required for A-level Performance:*

- Orchestrate consensus that there will be no new national HEU enrichment or plutonium reprocessing
- Close current NPT loophole that permits signatories to develop nuclear fuel production capabilities
- Guarantee supply of reactor fuel to non-nuclear weapons states at prices less than half national production costs
- Organize program to securely store spent fuel from civilian reactors
- Persuade all states to adopt the Additional Protocol
- Limit import of equipment for existing civilian programs to states that have signed Additional Protocol
- Expand Proliferation Security Initiative beyond current states
- Accelerate and highlight deep cuts in U.S.-Russian nuclear arms, and minimize role of nuclear weapons as fulfillment of NPT Article IV
- Resume Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations
- Make grand bargain with Iran: in exchange for dismantlement of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, offer fuel-cycle agreement, acceptance of Bushehr, relaxation of trade sanctions, and security guarantee
- Pose credible threats to Iran sufficient to persuade it to accept grand bargain.
No New Nuclear States

Actions Required for A-level Performance:

- Draw bright line under today’s eight nuclear powers and declare: no more
- Subordinate all other policy objectives on N. Korea (e.g., regime change) to this goal
- Offer carrots in exchange for verifiable dismantlement: bilateral non-aggression pledge, expansion of food aid, resumption of Japan–S. Korea fuel shipments
- Describe further benefits in a step-by-step plan to roll back N. Korea’s nuclear program: financing for natural gas pipeline, construction of a light-water reactor, aid for infrastructure reconstruction, N. Korean Nunn-Lugar, eventual normalization or relations
- Pose credible threat to North Korea sufficient to persuade it to choose freeze and start down path to eliminate nuclear weapons
- Ratify Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

NOTES

Preventing a Nuclear 9/11

Matthew Bunn

The danger that terrorists could get and use a nuclear weapon or the essential ingredients to make one remains all too real. To reduce the risk of a nuclear 9/11, a fast-paced campaign to lock down all stockpiles of nuclear warheads and potential nuclear bomb materials worldwide is urgently needed to keep these items from being stolen and transferred to terrorists. Sustained presidential leadership will be needed to overcome the myriad obstacles to the intensive international cooperation focused on improving secret security measures for sometimes secret nuclear stockpiles that is required.

THE ESSENTIAL FACTS

The facts that frame the danger of nuclear terrorism are stark:

Terrorists want the bomb. Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of nuclear weapons a “religious duty,” and has repeatedly attempted to purchase nuclear material for a bomb and to recruit nuclear expertise—including meeting with two senior Pakistani nuclear scientists to discuss nuclear weapons.

No Manhattan project required. Repeated government studies have concluded that with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium in hand, making a crude bomb might well be within the capabilities of a sophisticated terrorist group. Only a relatively small group, with modest machine-shop facilities and no access to classified information, might be sufficient. U.S. intelligence concluded before 9/11 that making a crude nuclear bomb was within al Qaeda’s capabilities, if they got the needed material.
Huge global nuclear stockpiles, some poorly secured. More than 20,000 nuclear weapons and over 2,300 tons of HEU and separated plutonium (enough nuclear material for over 200,000 bombs) now exist in the world. The essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist in hundreds of buildings in some 40 countries, with security measures ranging from excellent to appalling. Civilian facilities such as HEU-fueled research reactors (including those in the United States) often have no more security than a night watchman and a chain-link fence. The most egregious nuclear security weaknesses in the former Soviet Union—from gaping holes in security fences to the lack of any detector to set off an alarm if nuclear material was being removed—have largely been fixed, but the threat of nuclear theft there remains very real, as terrorists and criminals there have demonstrated the ability to carry out large attacks without warning, and to orchestrate substantial insider theft conspiracies. In Pakistan, a much smaller nuclear stockpile is heavily guarded but faces huge threats both from armed remnants of al Qaeda and other jihadi groups operating in the country and from nuclear insiders with a proven willingness to sell almost anything to almost anyone. Nuclear theft is not a hypothetical worry but an ongoing reality: the International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed 18 cases of theft of plutonium or HEU to date. Indeed, because the rudimentary nuclear accounting system used in the Soviet Union was designed to monitor Cold War production, not to detect theft, no one will ever know how much material may already have gone missing; even in the United States, some two tons of plutonium is officially unaccounted for (though it is unlikely any of that material was stolen, no one will ever be able to prove that it was not).

Needed nuclear material small and easy to hide and smuggle. A crude terrorist bomb might require 6–8 kilograms of plutonium—just over what would fit in a single soda can. The simplest and most inefficient bomb design, a “gun-type” bomb, requires roughly a six-pack of HEU. (The Hiroshima bomb, was a cannon that fired a shell of HEU into rings of HEU; it used 60 kilograms of HEU enriched to roughly 80% uranium-235.) The nuclear material for a bomb could easily be carried in a suitcase or two. The radiation it emits is weak and easy to shield—particularly in the case of HEU. As a result, many of the radiation detectors now being put in place at U.S. borders and around the world would not be able to detect shielded HEU—and searching for a hidden bomb over a large area is extraordinarily difficult. The long and
porous U.S. borders, the myriad people and vehicles crossing them, the many pathways to cross them, and the small size and low radiation of the material needed for a bomb conspire to make the smugglers’ job easy and the detectors’ job difficult. Moreover, if the United States got warning tomorrow that a terrorist nuclear bomb was located in a particular U.S. city—but no other information was available—there would be little chance of finding it within, say, 48 hours.

**Consequences devastating.** A terrorist nuclear bomb could turn the heart of any modern city into a smoking ruin. One study estimated that a terrorist bomb with an explosive power equivalent to 10,000 tons of TNT (smaller than the Hiroshima bomb), detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical workday, would kill 500,000 people and cause $1 trillion in direct economic damage (with total damage, including economic effects, going far beyond that). America and the world would never be the same.

**Bomb materials too difficult for terrorists to make themselves.** Producing HEU requires technically challenging and expensive enrichment processes, to separate uranium-235 (U-235) from the U-238 that makes up more than 99% of natural uranium. Producing plutonium typically requires irradiating U-238 in a nuclear reactor, and then chemically separating the plutonium from the irradiated fuel (a step known as reprocessing). It is extremely unlikely that terrorist groups will be able to produce either material in the foreseeable future—which means that if the stockpiles produced by states can be protected from theft and transfer to terrorists, nuclear terrorism can be prevented.

There is no convincing evidence that any terrorist group has yet acquired a nuclear bomb, or the materials and expertise to make one. But such a proliferation disaster could occur at any time.

**AN IMPORTANT BUT INADEQUATE RESPONSE**

Blocking the terrorist pathway to the bomb requires a multi-layered defense, from the counterterrorist struggle to improved nuclear detection at key border crossings and within the United States. But the most crucial element of that defense is to ensure that nuclear weapons or materials are not stolen in the first place: once these items are carried out the door of the facility where they are supposed to be, the problems of finding them and stopping terrorists from using them multiply a thousand-fold.
Theft of nuclear weapons or materials is the most likely route by which these items might fall into terrorist hands. Conscious state decisions to transfer such items to terrorists are highly unlikely—particularly because the devastating retaliation that would result if a terrorist nuclear attack were traced back to its source would threaten the survival of the regime that provided the means for the attack. Nevertheless, gaining international agreement on packages of carrots and sticks large and credible enough to convince Iran and North Korea to verifiably give up their quest for nuclear weapons is one important part of preventing nuclear terrorism.

Many elements of the response to this threat are making progress. With its Afghanistan sanctuary removed, and its former leadership dead, captured, or in hiding, al Qaeda has less chance of making a nuclear bomb today than it once did—though there remains a real chance that one group in the global movement that is today’s al Qaeda could put

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**Other Types of Nuclear and Radiological Attack**

This paper focuses only on the most devastating type of nuclear terrorism—the use of an actual nuclear explosive. Sabotage of a major nuclear facility could also result in a major catastrophe, potentially requiring the evacuation of hundreds of thousands or even millions of people and causing tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in economic damage. In most cases the number of immediate deaths would be modest, but there might be thousands of long-term cancer deaths. Key policies to reduce this danger are improved security and safety measures at nuclear sites, and more effective evacuation plans.

The most likely type of nuclear-related terrorism is dispersal of radioactive material in a so-called “dirty bomb.” A dirty bomb could create an expensive and annoying mess, requiring the evacuation of many blocks, and potentially causing tens of billions of dollars in disruption and cleanup costs. Few if any deaths would be likely to result, however. Key policies to reduce this danger focus on improved public education about the dangers of radiation, strengthened response and cleanup capabilities, beefed-up detection capabilities, and stronger security at least for the most dangerous of the hundreds of thousands of radiological sources in use in virtually every country of the world.

Nuclear threats and hoaxes—which happen more often than many people realize—can also pose a serious threat if they are judged to be credible. A group that only had an ounce of HEU, for example, might send a vial of that material, with a plausible blueprint of a bomb, as “proof” that it had a nuclear bomb. Improved approaches to assessing the credibility of such threats, and policy exercises to explore how the system would respond to a credible threat, can reduce the risk.
together the needed capabilities and build a bomb without being detected before it is too late. Cooperative threat reduction programs like Nunn-Lugar, sponsored by the United States and other countries, have demonstrably improved security at scores of buildings in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, permanently destroyed thousands of bombs’ worth of nuclear material, put radiation detection equipment at scores of key border crossings around the world, and offered at least temporary civilian re-employment for thousands of nuclear experts who were no longer needed. (It is a little-known fact, for example, that nearly half of the nuclear electricity generated in the United States is fueled by material from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads.) These efforts have represented an excellent investment in U.S. and world security.

But in virtually every category of effort, far more remains to be done. By the end of fiscal year (FY) 2005, U.S.-funded comprehensive security and accounting upgrades had been completed for only 54% of buildings in the former Soviet Union containing potential nuclear bomb material. The summit accord on nuclear security that President Bush and Russian President Putin agreed on at Bratislava in early 2005 has accelerated progress, and demonstrates what presidential leadership can do. But meeting the 2008 deadline for completing an agreed set of security upgrades that U.S. and Russian experts agreed to after Bratislava remains

### Terrorist Suitcase Nukes? Probably Not

One of Boris Yeltsin’s national security advisors, Alexander Lebed, once claimed that a large number of small, portable nuclear weapons—so-called “suitcase nukes”—were missing. The Russian Ministry of Defense hotly denied this charge.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union did produce small nuclear weapons intended to be carried by one or two people—“atomic demolition munitions,” as the U.S. versions were called—as well as small weapons such as nuclear artillery shells. All of the U.S. versions of these weapons, and most or all of the Russian versions, have since been dismantled. Responsible Russian generals, even in private with Americans they know and trust, swear that Lebed was mistaken, and that all such weapons are accounted for. Lebed, who was known for a wide range of extreme statements, later claimed he had never said that any of the suitcase nukes were actually missing, only that they were not properly accounted for. There is no reason to believe that any of the occasional media reports that al Qaeda or other terrorists have such a weapon is correct. A crude nuclear bomb that terrorists made themselves might fit in a van, but not in a suitcase. This episode highlights the importance of joint accounting and ultimately secure, monitored dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly those not equipped with modern, difficult-to-bypass electronic locks.
an immense challenge, and some key nuclear material and nuclear warhead sites are not on the agreed list. Moreover, serious questions remain as to whether the security measures being put in place—which are less than those the Department of Energy is now requiring at its own facilities—will be enough to protect Russia’s stockpiles against the huge insider and outsider threats in Russia, and whether Russia will sustain effective nuclear security after U.S. assistances phases out (as is scheduled to occur by 2013).

Elsewhere in the world, there has been much less progress. In most countries, U.S.-sponsored security upgrades have barely begun, or are not yet even on the agenda. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), launched in early 2004, has accelerated the pace of removing HEU from vulnerable sites around the world, but some of its timelines for removing HEU stretch to 2014–2019, and serious gaps remain. Two-thirds of the U.S.-origin HEU abroad is not yet eligible for the U.S. offer to take it back; nearly half the research reactors using HEU around the world are not yet targeted for conversion to low-enriched fuel that cannot be used in a nuclear bomb; few incentives are being offered to most facilities to convince them to allow their potential bomb material to be removed; and no effort is being made to convince aging and unneeded research reactors to shut down (an approach likely to be quicker and cheaper than conversion to low-enriched fuel, in many cases).

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched at the G8 summit in 2002, has been neither global nor targeted on the most urgent measures to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction: it has been allowed to drift focused entirely within a few countries of the former Soviet Union, and has focused on submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction, with only a dribble of non-U.S. money going to securing nuclear stockpiles. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Office of Nuclear Security has been allowed to limp along with funding and authority clearly far short of what it needs to make the maximum contribution to preventing nuclear terrorism. No global coalition to prevent nuclear terrorism, no binding global nuclear security standards, and no truly comprehensive plan for securing all the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials around the world yet exists.

Total U.S. spending on cooperative programs to control nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise, at just over $1 billion per year, represents
one quarter of one percent of U.S. defense spending. Nevertheless, only a few of these programs could be greatly accelerated by simply writing a larger check. Rather, the most fundamental missing ingredient of faster progress is sustained high-level leadership. While President Bush has repeatedly emphasized the danger of nuclear terrorism, he, like President Clinton before him, has not provided the sustained, day-in and day-out focus needed to overcome the myriad obstacles to ensuring that nuclear stockpiles around the world are secure and accounted for. In many cases, problems have been allowed to fester unresolved for years at a time. The huge Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak in Russia, for example, built with hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. assistance, remains empty almost three years after it was completed.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW

The danger of nuclear theft and terrorism is a global problem, requiring a global response. The key to a stronger and faster response is sustained presidential leadership.

President Bush could dramatically accelerate the effort by, in effect, telling everyone in his government: “I want every warhead and every kilogram of nuclear material worldwide secured, as fast as it can possibly be done, but certainly in no more than six years. I’m appointing some one with the sole job of leading these efforts, and finding and fixing every obstacle that is slowing them down—and they will be able to walk into my office whenever there is a decision I need to make. I will make the tough choices to resolve any problem slowing these efforts. We will make this a top priority of U.S. foreign policy, to be addressed at every opportunity, at every level, until the job is done. I want U.S. intelligence focused on identifying the highest risks of nuclear theft and key issues for policies to fix them. I am prepared to put several billion additional dollars, beyond current budgets, into the effort over the next few years. And I will fire anyone who I find slowing this down.” President Bush should immediately issue a decision directive along these lines, making the priority of this agenda clear. Several particular initiatives are needed now.

A global coalition to prevent nuclear terrorism. President Bush should immediately begin working with Russia and other leading nuclear-weapon and nuclear-energy states to forge a global coalition to prevent
nuclear terrorism, whose participants would agree to protect all of their nuclear stockpiles to an agreed standard sufficient to defeat the threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose; encourage, assist, and pressure other states to do likewise; sustain effective nuclear security for the long haul using their own resources; reduce the number of locations where nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials are located (thereby achieving higher security at lower cost); and take other steps to cooperate to reduce the dangers of nuclear terrorism, from expanding intelligence and law enforcement cooperation targeted on nuclear theft and smuggling to putting in place criminal laws making actual or attempted nuclear theft or terrorism a crime comparable with murder or treason.

Bilateral cooperation with Russia and other countries should continue, framed as a genuine partnership within this global coalition, and focused particularly on ensuring that security measures are put in place that are sufficient to meet the threats that exist in each country; forging strong security cultures, so that guards do not patrol without ammunition or turn off intrusion detectors (both of which have occurred, both in Russia and the United States); and ensuring that high levels of security for nuclear stockpiles will be sustained after international assistance phases out.

**Effective global nuclear security standards.** Facing terrorists with global reach, nuclear security is only as good as its weakest link—so global standards adequate to ensure that all stockpiles are protected from plausible theft attempts are urgently needed. Past attempts to negotiate such standards in binding treaties have largely failed—blocked by a least-common-denominator dynamic among mid-level officials unable to agree on anything that their nation’s nuclear industry might see as unduly costly or intrusive. The best hope for creating an effective global standard is likely to be a quick top-level political agreement—perhaps initiated at a G8 summit—on a standard specific enough to be effective, but flexible enough to allow each country to pursue its own approach to nuclear security. For example, the agreed standard might be that all nuclear weapons and significant caches of weapons-usable nuclear materials must be protected at least against two small groups of well-armed and well-trained outsiders, one to two well-placed insiders, or both outsiders and insiders working together. Participants in the global coalition
would agree to secure their stockpiles at least to this standard, and help encourage and pressure others to do likewise. Such a standard could become legally binding if enough states agreed that this was what was needed for nuclear security measures to be “appropriate” and effective” as legally required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

**An accelerated and expanded “global cleanout.”** The only way to guarantee that nuclear material will not be stolen from a particular site is to remove it, so there is nothing left to steal. The United States should immediately begin working with other countries to take steps to accelerate and expand the removal of weapons-usable nuclear material from vulnerable sites around the world—and take steps to ensure that high levels of security will be put in place and maintained where material cannot immediately be removed. The goal should be to remove the nuclear material entirely from the world’s most vulnerable sites within four years—substantially upgrading security wherever that cannot be accomplished—and to eliminate all HEU from civil sites worldwide within roughly a decade. The United States should expand its take-back offer to cover all U.S.-supplied HEU, and, on a case-by-case basis, other weapons-usable nuclear material that poses a proliferation threat—and should convince states such as Russia, Britain, and France to make similar offers. A major effort should be launched to convince countries and operators to shut down unneeded HEU-fueled research reactors. The United States and other coalition partners should offer substantial packages of incentives, targeted to the needs of each country and facility, to convince facilities to convert or shut-down, and to give up their nuclear material.

**Building the needed sense of urgency.** The United States should immediately begin taking action to convince political leaders and facility managers around the world that nuclear theft and terrorism is a real and urgent threat to their own countries, worthy of their time and money. Steps in this direction should include: threat briefings for key foreign leaders, given jointly by experts from the United States and their own countries; encouraging key states to carry out fast-paced reviews of security at their nuclear sites by trusted teams of experts; working with key states to put in place regular systems of realistic security testing, in which “red teams” test facilities’ protection against outsider and insider thieves; carrying out war games and similar exercises with policymakers.
of key states, to get them to think through how nuclear material might be stolen and the situation they would face if it was; creating shared databases of unclassified information on security incidents and lessons learned from them; and putting in place strong incentives for states and facilities to provide effective nuclear security, from strong nuclear security regulation to preferences in U.S. contracts for facilities that have demonstrated superior nuclear security performance.

**A full-time senior official to take the lead.** Remarkably, today there is no senior official of the U.S. government with responsibility for leading all the myriad efforts related to preventing nuclear terrorism. President Bush should appoint a senior full-time White House official, with the access needed to walk in and ask for presidential action when needed, to lead these efforts, and keep them on the front burner at the White House every day. That official would be responsible for finding and fixing the obstacles to progress, setting priorities, eliminating overlaps, and seizing opportunities for synergy. As part of the global coalition described above, President Bush should lean on Russian President Putin and the leaders of other coalition participants to do the same.

**Partnership-based approaches.** To get the “buy-in” essential to ensuring that nuclear security equipment will be used effectively and sustained for the long haul, security managers and staff have to be convinced that the new security measures were in large part their idea, not something imposed by Americans. Hence, the United States should base its international nuclear security approaches on genuine partnership, with experts from each country where these stockpiles reside playing key roles in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the entire effort in their countries, moving away from donor-recipient relationships. Strategic plans, timetables, and milestones should be developed jointly by the country where the nuclear stockpiles in question exist and its foreign partners, using both the country’s own funds and foreign funds—not set and controlled from Washington. Because genuine nuclear security partnerships cannot be built in a political vacuum, other steps to increase or decrease cooperation with particular countries—particularly with respect to nuclear technologies—should be considered in the light of their potential effect on cooperation to ensure effective nuclear security.
Flexible approaches to secrecy and access to sites. Many of the stockpiles that need improved security, and the security measures now in place for them, are closely held secrets, and are likely to remain that way. The United States should take flexible approaches to ensuring that taxpayer funds are spent appropriately without insisting that recipients give up their nuclear secrets—for example relying on photographs, videotapes, and operational reports on equipment in use at a secret site rather than insisting on direct access by U.S. personnel in every case.

A LONG ROAD YET TO TRAVEL

As President Bush has said, the nations of the world must do “everything in our power” to ensure that terrorists never gain control of the fearsome power of a nuclear bomb. The steps recommended above could lead the way toward a faster, more effective, and more comprehensive effort to lock down the world’s nuclear stockpiles before terrorists and criminals can get to them. There is still time to win the race to prevent a nuclear 9/11.

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There are similarities and connections, as well as important differences, between the cases of North Korea and Iran.

In both cases, the prospect of these states acquiring a nuclear weapons arsenal has regional implications. In Northeast Asia, a North Korea with nuclear weapons threatens other states in the region, beginning with South Korea and Japan. The DPRK has developed a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), the No Dung, which could reach Japan. The North can be counted upon to try to design a weapon that could be mated with its MRBM so that it could blackmail or deter Tokyo in a crisis. Since Seoul is within range of the North’s artillery deployed along the DMZ, the North already poses a nuclear threat to the South. The fact that the South Korean public apparently does not see the North as a threat does not mean that the government in Seoul is as relaxed. The first point, then, is that Seoul and Tokyo may eventually react to a growing North Korean nuclear weapons program with decisions to abandon their own non-nuclear status and dependence on alliance with the United States, withdraw from the NPT—as North Korea already has—and develop nuclear weapons of their own. It should be recalled that the South Koreans had a secret program in the 1970s and that both these countries have advanced nuclear energy programs that could be converted into substantial nuclear
weapons programs in short order, in a few years at the most. Obviously, if either Japan or the ROK were to begin such a process, it would sharply increase the likelihood that the other would do likewise.

Similarly, should Iran succeed in creating a nuclear weapons capability, it is likely to prompt others in the Middle East to consider doing the same. The Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, would be among the first to weigh the pros and cons of becoming a nuclear weapons state to prevent a Persian hegemony over the Gulf. Iran has deployed an MRBM of its own, the Shahab III, based on the North Korean No Dung, which can reach targets as far away as Israel. Like the North Koreans, the Iranians would have to design a weapon that could be delivered by their missile, but this is thought to be the principal reason why they acquired their MRBM in the first place since its inaccuracy makes it a poor delivery system for conventional explosives.

Second, in addition to creating regional instability and beginning the unraveling of the NPT regime, both of these cases pose direct threats to the interests of the United States. Once North Korea and Iran have nuclear weapons, deployments of American forces to the region will have to take account of their nuclear capability. While we may continue to rely on deterrence to dissuade any nuclear use against our forces, circumstances could emerge where we will be limited in our options because of the nuclear threat, particularly in scenarios where the regimes of those states believe their survival is threatened and thus fail to see our retaliation as unacceptable.

Perhaps the gravest threat these states pose to the United States does not arise from their stockpiling of nuclear weapons, but from their accumulation of fissile material. We have a long history of living with the threat posed by potentially hostile states armed with nuclear weapons, against which we had and have no defense, that is, the Soviet Union and China. We dealt with that threat by the development of a robust deterrent capability, promising to do to any attacker what it would regard as unacceptable damage, in the event of an attack on the United States or its allies. Now, with the emergence of terrorist entities such as Al Qaeda, we may not be certain who was responsible for an attack, and we can have no confidence that the promise of retaliation would discourage one. In this world, the key to defending our cities is preventing terrorists from getting nuclear weapons or the material necessary to make them. Today that means persuading Russia and Pakistan to do a lot better at securing
their fissile material and nuclear weapons; tomorrow that could mean trying to convince Iran and North Korea that we will find out if they were to sell such material or weapons to Al Qaeda. In short, both these countries’ fissile material production programs pose a deadly threat to American cities that we have no sure way of meeting.

CAPABILITIES

There are also differences in the capabilities of these countries and the circumstances of the policy situation. North Korea had a small plutonium producing reactor and reprocessing facility which it used to produce and separate plutonium in the early 1990s. These facilities were effectively frozen for about ten years following the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994. However, after the collapse of the Framework in the first Bush Administration, the North restarted plutonium production in its reactor at approximately a bomb’s worth per year, and claims to have separated the plutonium that had been sealed during the period of the Agreed Framework.

Most estimates would credit North Korea with now having approximately forty kilograms of plutonium, enough for perhaps eight nuclear weapons. In addition, our intelligence community detected significant numbers of components for a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program being transferred from Pakistan to the DPRK during the late nineteen nineties through the early part of this decade. We do not know where this equipment is, or if it has been assembled into a cascade of machines, or if it is in operation. Estimates about when the North might also be producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons are therefore highly speculative, but prudence would have us expect the North Koreans to eventually master the technology and develop another source of fissile material.

Iran, by contrast, has little in the way of operating nuclear facilities, but substantially more potential for fissile material production than North Korea over time. Iran has one power reactor very nearly completed by the Russians located at Bushehr. This is a light water reactor, easy to safeguard, whose spent fuel is difficult to reprocess for weapons, and possibly subject to other provisions negotiated by Moscow that make it relatively “proliferation resistant.” The concern over Iran stems from two programs: a gas centrifuge program that now includes only
164 operating machines but which is planned to grow to one of thousands of machines, about which international attention is now focused; and a plutonium production program centered on a heavy water moderated “research” reactor, now in the design phase following Russian assistance, and which has received little notice. Iran may be as far away from accumulating fissile material as five to ten years, if their capacity is limited to what we are now aware of, or it could be much closer, if it has constructed and even begun operating a secret centrifuge cascade.

**POLICY**

Administration policy to deal with the threat posed by both these countries has suffered from the same handicap: unwillingness at the top of the Bush administration to embrace negotiation as a legitimate and potentially effective way of addressing such threats from “rogue regimes.” In the case of North Korea, the president let it be known during his first couple of months in office that he doubted the utility of the kind of negotiation with the DPRK that had been pursued by the Clinton administration, much to the dismay of the government in Seoul which had invested heavily, financially and politically, in the so called sunshine policy of openness with the North. While nothing much happened during the first year of the Bush administration in Washington’s relations with Pyongyang or Tehran, America suffered the attacks of September 11, which had an important psychological impact on the administration. The first State of the Union Address by the President in January 2002 laid out his approach to North Korea and Iran by lumping them with Iraq and describing them collectively as an axis of evil, which threatened international security by their association with terrorist allies. Months later, the President’s commencement speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point foreshadowed the national security strategy, formally enunciated in the fall of 2002, which described a policy of pre-emption as appropriate to threats to the national security of the kind posed by these rogue regimes.

Against this backdrop, the Bush administration took the position that it would not talk with the North Koreans outside of the “six party context,” that is, a meeting of China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and the United States. Furthermore, it would not negotiate with the North until it committed to give up its secret uranium enrichment program and allow inspections to verify its compliance with
its obligations under the NPT and the Agreed Framework. While the North Koreans initially refused to meet in the six-party context, they eventually agreed and a number of meetings among the parties took place, beginning in 2003 and ending in September, 2005. At the last meeting, there was agreement in principal on the rough outlines of a new framework, but there have been no meetings since then. What little progress was made has effectively been stalled, the North Koreans complaining that an American action to sanction a bank in China for dealing in North Korean counterfeit currency amounts to sanctions on the North, a situation it says must end before the DPRK will return to the table. Thus, the current situation has North Korea continuing to produce plutonium, and probably expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal, even as it works to construct a gas centrifuge facility that will yield still more fissile material.

The administration, having no faith in or enthusiasm for negotiations with Pyongyang, and no military option absent knowledge of the location of weapons, material or enrichment facility, is left without a policy for North Korea. In the meantime, the South Koreans continue to do business with the North, decreasing the incentive in the North to reach an agreement with the United States.

The situation with Iran has some of the same elements that are present in the North Korean case. The administration’s unwillingness to engage Tehran has meant that negotiations with Iran over the years about ending its uranium enrichment program have been left to the Europeans—Britain, France and Germany—the Russians, and the IAEA. The United States has always favored bringing the matter to the UN Security Council, even though it was far from clear that the Council would be able to act given the veto power of both Russia and China. The basis for such a move was the discovery that Iran had secret nuclear facilities that it failed to submit to the IAEA for inspection. When Iran refused to terminate its enrichment program, the IAEA board ultimately did report the matter to the UN Security Council, where it now rests. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese appear willing to support any sanctions resolution that could lead to the use of force. With the United States still publicly declaring its disinterest in any direct discussions with Iran, and Iran continuing to construct the necessary facilities for a large centrifuge program, our policy is stalemated here as well.
The policy prescription in both cases, North Korea and Iran, is the same: develop a serious negotiating position and engage both parties in direct discussions aimed at resolving the issues. In the case of North Korea, this would mean that we would have to be prepared to make serious concessions in the interest of gaining significantly from the North. On our side, we should be willing to give the North the bilateral negative security guarantees it seeks, regenerate the light water reactor program that had been initiated under the 1994 Agreed Framework and then abandoned in 2003, remove continuing sanctions against business with North Korea, and generally normalize relations with the North. We have to be prepared to do all this, without requiring fundamental changes in the North’s government or human rights policy. The near term benefits would be limited to national and international security, while our concern for the people of North Korea would have to be addressed over the longer term, much as we approach other governments whose domestic policies we find repugnant. On their side, we would have to require of the North that it give up its uranium enrichment activity, cease reprocessing and dismantle its gas graphite nuclear program as had been planned under the Agreed Framework, disassemble its nuclear weapons and submit accumulated plutonium to safeguards before removal from the country, and return to the NPT—and all this under an inspection regime that would have to be more extensive than the standard IAEA provisions.

The Iranian case requires that the United States develop with the Europeans and the Russians a robust set of incentives that are materially significant and which address the issues of national prerogative raised by our insistence that Iran abandon its uranium enrichment program. That package of incentives must be coupled with a set of sanctions whose effects would ultimately be felt by the regime, not just the people. The key to the Iran case is Russia: with Russian cooperation on sanctions and incentives, Tehran would have no place to turn; without Moscow aboard, the impact of American and European action will be undercut. At the same time, the possibility that the international community might at some point sanction military action aimed at slowing or stopping the Iranian nuclear program must be kept alive. Facing sanctions and suffering a possible air strike on the one hand, and enjoying a range of financial and trade inducements—including guaranteed access to uranium enrichment services—on the other, might well persuade Tehran to agree
to freeze its enrichment activity until it developed a light water reactor economy that could plausibly justify the development of its own enrichment facility. This would likely take a decade or two. Again, as with North Korea, the key is the willingness of the United States to directly engage Iran, rather than continuing to leave the responsibility of negotiations to others as we deplore the lack of progress.

THE INDIA DEAL

Three points about the deal should be made. The first is that those who advocate making this special arrangement to permit nuclear cooperation with India ought to be clear—and honest—about why they are doing so. The second is that the reasons for making the particular deal they propose, while important, do not justify the cost to the national security of doing so. And third, that there is an arrangement which would, in fact, strike the right balance between competing national security interests, an arrangement that may be negotiable at some future time, if not now.

Our non-proliferation policy has been a chronic irritant to US–India relations over the last thirty years. We should acknowledge the importance that India attaches to American willingness to change that policy so that the United States can begin to sell it nuclear equipment, material and technology. We should also admit that the proposed deal would grant what New Delhi values most, namely our acceptance of India as a nuclear weapons state. And while we are at it, we should admit that although the deal would be critically important to our goal of improving relations with India, it will really do nothing to help us deal with the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Assertions to the contrary are less than forthright.

There is no reason why we should attach any positive value to India’s willingness to submit a few additional nuclear facilities of its choosing to international safeguards, so long as other fissile material producing facilities are free from safeguards. This move has been called “symbolic” by critics, but it is not at all clear what useful purpose it symbolizes. The other elements of the deal that are supposed to contribute to its non-proliferation value were in place before the deal was struck. The first point then, is that the Administration proposes this deal to address a genuine regional security objective and not because it helps in any way our global security concern over nuclear proliferation.
The second point is that the proposed arrangement will be too costly to the national security to be justified by gain in relations with India.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age and the arrival of intercontinental ballistic missiles, our nation has been defenseless against devastating attack—leaving us to rely on deterrence, the promise of retaliation, to deal with nuclear armed enemies. From the beginning, we recognized that this left us vulnerable to anyone who could not be deterred, and so, in some basic way, our security depended on limiting the number of countries that ultimately acquired nuclear weapons. Most analysts believe that fifty years of non-proliferation policy has something to do with explaining why the spread of nuclear technology has not led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, why we live in a world of eight or nine nuclear weapons states, rather than eighty or ninety. A key part of that policy has been our support for an international norm captured in the very nearly universally adhered to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The norm is simple: in the interest of international security, no more states should acquire nuclear weapons. There are many provisions in the treaty and details to be understood to fully appreciate the norm, but that is its essence. Certainly the fact that we have eight or nine states with nuclear weapons rather than only the original five, means that the norm has not held perfectly well. But it has had substantial force in the face of widespread acquisition of critical nuclear technologies, and that has been of vital importance to America’s security. Simply put, the Administration now proposes to destroy that norm.

Some claim the deal would only recognize the reality of India’s nuclear weapons program. But that is not accurate. Recognizing that India and a few additional countries have acquired nuclear weapons over the last three decades is not the issue. The damage will be done to the non-proliferation norm by legitimatizing India’s condition, by exempting it from a policy that has held for decades. And we would do this, we assert less than honestly, because of its exceptionally good behavior. In truth, we would reward India with nuclear cooperation because we now place such a high value on improved relations with New Delhi, not because of its uniquely good behavior.

Critics ask, if we do this deal, how will we explain, defend, and promote our policy of stopping Iran’s proposed uranium enrichment program? Iran is, after all, a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as far as we know, has no fissile material outside of international
safeguards and has never detonated a nuclear explosive device. A good question, but not the best one because India has arguably been a more responsible member of the international community than Iran. Rather, if we do this deal, ask how we will avoid offering a similar one to Brazil or Argentina if they decide on nuclear weapons acquisition, or our treaty ally South Korea. Dozens of countries around the world have exhibited good behavior in nuclear matters, and have the capability to produce nuclear weapons, but choose not to, at least in part, because of the international norm against nuclear weapons acquisition, reinforced by a policy we would now propose to abandon. If we do this, we will put at risk a world of very few nuclear weapons states, and open the door to the true proliferation of nuclear weapons in the years ahead.

Finally, if there are two national security objectives in conflict here, one regional and the other global, is it possible to reconcile them? The answer is probably yes, but not now, not in the current context. Clearly and regrettably, if the Administration’s proposal does not succeed, in much the same form in which it has been put forth, US-India relations will deteriorate for a time. But acknowledging that does not mean that we should go ahead with a deal that would do irreparable damage to our long-term national security interests. Instead, we should put forth a proposal that more nearly balances regional and global security interests, recognizing that it will be some time, at best, before it will appeal to New Delhi.

The proposal would permit nuclear cooperation with India, if it accepts a reasonably verifiable ban on the production of any more fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. This approach would permit India reprocessing and enrichment facilities, but effectively require international safeguards on all its nuclear facilities and any nuclear material produced in the future. Its appeal in regional terms is that it would allow India to pursue nuclear energy without restrictions of any kind—more than we are willing to do for Iran at the moment. From the global security perspective, we will have succeeded in capping a nuclear weapons program, a substantive achievement which arguably offsets a breach of the long-standing policy against nuclear cooperation with a state such as India that does not accept full-scope safeguards. The deal would have to have other provisions, such as rigorous nuclear export control policies, a ban on export of enrichment or reprocessing technology, and a permanent prohibition on nuclear explosive testing, but this is its essence.
The deal described above would require India to choose between the opportunity to expand its nuclear energy program on the one hand, and the expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal on the other. The Administration proposes to allow India to do both, and that would be a mistake. Our security depends on maintaining the norm against nuclear weapons proliferation.

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Iraq Disengagement

BARRY POSEN

The U.S. counter-insurgency and state building effort in Iraq has entered its fourth year, with no end in sight. The U.S. and its remaining allies are simultaneously waging an intense counter insurgency campaign against Sunni Arab militants, a less intense but still costly counter insurgency campaign against Shiite militias, a “peace enforcement” operation among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, and a state-building effort that includes the training and equipping of Iraqi national police and army units. Though the administration can cite examples of progress in these four efforts, progress is slow. The struggle against the two insurgencies is best characterized as a dynamic stalemate in which the insurgents, the U.S. and its allies, and the nascent Iraqi government all intermittently achieve modest gains and suffer offsetting losses, with no sign of a true breakthrough for any party. This dynamic stalemate is costly to the U.S. in terms of money, the lives and health of its troops, the slowly eroding vitality of the U.S. Army’s enlisted and officer cadres, and the reputation of the United States in Arab and Islamic countries. The Administration’s “strategy” is not working and needs to be replaced.

A new strategy would pursue U.S. interests in Iraq from the outside in, rather than the inside out. It would seek to shape rather than administer, to influence rather than control. A key component of a new strategy is a firm commitment to disengage U.S. troops from Iraq by a date certain. At this moment July 1, 2007 seems a reasonable deadline; this would provide ample time to synchronize the diplomatic, political, and military elements of a new strategy, and to manage a secure and deliberate re-deployment of U.S. troops out of Iraq. To achieve the twin political purposes of de-energizing the insurgency, and re-energizing Iraq’s nascent government, this date must be announced publicly, and the U.S. must stick to it. The announcement of a date certain helps the U.S.
achieve its interests, because the U.S. presence in Iraq causes many of the problems that it is meant to solve.

The U.S. presence in Iraq helps to cause stalemate in two ways. First, the U.S. presence feeds energy into the ideological “-isms” that generate support for the insurgency inside and outside the country. Second, the U.S. presence serves as a safety net that permits key Iraqi actors to behave irresponsibly, because they know that U.S. forces are there to protect them from the consequences.

The U.S. presence energizes the insurgency in five inter-related ways:

1. It stimulates Iraqi nationalism and patriotism—the standard and predictable reaction to a foreign occupation. These values motivate both Sunni and Shia insurgents.

2. It catalyzes Islamic fundamentalism inside and outside Iraq. Islam has enjoyed a great revival among its followers in recent years, and many Iraqis find it intolerable that a non-Muslim army is on its soil determining its politics. This also draws support from outside the country.

3. The U.S. presence aggravates sectarianism. The U.S. victory knocked the Sunni Arab minority off its former perch as the dominant political force in the country. From the point of view of many Sunni Arabs, only the U.S. presence prevents them from reasserting their authority. Status reversal is a powerful motivator of violence by the losing group, and Iraqi Sunnis address their hostility to both the U.S. and to the Shia majority whom the U.S. has empowered.

4. The U.S. presence energizes “Pan Arabism.” Though this ideology has not typically been strong enough to facilitate easy cooperation among Arab states, it nevertheless is sufficiently strong to attract the attention of millions of Arabs abroad, some of whom send funds to support the insurgency, and some of whom actually journey to Iraq to fight the U.S.

5. These political and religious identities are only part of the story. Iraqis have strong family, clan, and tribal identities that produce unusual solidarity. When U.S. or Iraqi government forces kill, wound, or incarcerate an individual, this may prompt an emotional quest for revenge among many male extended family members.
The U.S. presence also enables unconstructive behavior by Iraqis who claim to share U.S. goals:

The political factions in Iraq will demand as great a share of Iraqi governmental positions and economic resources as they think their current relative power will allow. The close U.S. alignment with the Kurds and the Shia makes them feel very powerful, and encourages them to demand too much. Many Sunnis probably believe that absent U.S. military assistance to their enemies, they could perhaps defeat the more numerous Shia in a “fair fight” and garner a greater share of Iraq’s resources, so they also demand too much. The U.S. military presence is an obstacle to the Iraqi factions finding a legitimate, autonomous, measure of their relative power—which is a necessary prerequisite for a political deal.

- Iraqi political factions who claim to share U.S. goals nevertheless feel no sense of urgency. They can take their time forming governments and cleaning up ministries because they know that the U.S. will pick up the slack.
- Finally, the U.S. military, with the best of intentions, has produced an Iraqi military that is deeply dependent upon it. Because infantry battalions are the easiest units to produce, the Iraqi army is still missing all the other ingredients of a viable military organization—logistics, fire support, intelligence, command and control, and even accounting. Though U.S. trainers aim to remedy these lacunae, they seem in no hurry. Officers in the Iraqi Army seem comfortable with this dependency, as the U.S. guarantees them regular pay, and insures them against tactical defeats, with the promise of rapid reinforcement.

In sum, a clear plan for U.S. disengagement, with a date certain, will remove much of the political energy that feeds the insurgency, and simultaneously add a sense of political urgency to those Iraqi factions, bureaucracies, and military organizations that claim to want an orderly, stable, prosperous, and democratic Iraq.

Though disengagement is necessary to produce these positive results, it is only an element in a more elaborate strategy to protect U.S. interests. U.S. interests arise from one fact; Iraq and the surrounding region produce a great deal of oil. The U.S. is thus interested in ensuring that Iraqi oil wealth not fall into the hands of a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda, that Iraqi oil wealth not fall into the hands of a hostile state,
and that Iraq not become the occasion for a major regional war to divide its spoils. The latter would surely significantly disrupt the flow of oil from the Gulf with knock-on effects on western economies.

The U.S. thus has to use the interval between now and mid-2007 for three key strategic initiatives:

- First, the Iraqi Army needs to be made more resilient so that those Sunni insurgents most closely aligned with Al Qaeda would not be able to seize Baghdad in a coup de main. I consider this unlikely, but it must be guarded against. Those Americans training the Iraqi Army have to lower their sights and pick up the pace. The Iraqi Army seems not to lack for infantry battalions at this time. Yet, the Iraqi army looks too much like an appendage of the U.S. army. This connection needs to be broken. The Iraqi army needs its own logistics, command and control, intelligence, and fire support. These capabilities can be very basic, but they need to be there if the Army is not to succumb to a “sucker punch.”

- Second, the U.S. must remind others in the region of its strategic interests through both diplomacy and military actions. The U.S. should publicly commit itself to the integrity of Iraq’s external borders and to their military defense if need be. The U.S., and indeed the industrialized world, does not want to see a war to carve up Iraq, and the U.S. must plan to make such actions costly for those who would start them. The U.S. should inventory both the credible threats it can make to deter regional actors from adventurism, and the benefits it can offer to those who cooperate. Military capabilities should remain deployed in the region to make good on this commitment. Some have recommended international or regional conferences to sort out these issues. Regional powers may have an interest in helping to stabilize Iraq to forestall a set of events that would attract one or all of them to intervene, and thus risk regional war.

- Third, the U.S. needs to settle on a reasonable political outcome for Iraq’s domestic politics. The Administration now seems to have pinned its hopes on a “government of national unity” in which Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite parties would share power at the center, dole out the resources of the state in a way that most citizens would come to accept as fair, and credibly commit to protect the helpless of whatever ethnic or political stripe. It is hoped that this would reduce
political support for the Sunni insurgent groups, and for the armed Shia and Kurd militias.

The current U.S. scheme for a strong Iraqi central government seems unlikely to lead to a stable peace. As noted above, each faction almost surely believes it is entitled to more than the other factions believe reasonable or just. Thus it seems improbable that the factions inside the government will agree on key policies. Even if they do, it is optimistic to expect all their followers to accept these agreements. Moreover, all factions will hang on to their arms unless and until they are pretty sure that the government security forces will work in an ideal, fair and impartial way. Such certainty is unlikely. Thus, those political forces most hostile to agreement will retain the means to wreck political progress.

Instead of chasing the chimera of a unified, democratic Iraq, the U.S. should accept a weak central state, and support the decentralization of political power and administrative competencies. The factions in Iraq will have to work out how they want to decentralize power, whether to existing provinces, provinces with new boundaries, or new regions.

The Iraqis will not easily find the recipe for decentralized government, and the process will likely involve a continuation or even escalation of the nascent civil war. My own judgment of the military balance among the factions is that stalemate is a likely outcome of such a fight, unless the U.S. is foolish enough to pour tanks and artillery into the Iraqi Army. These weapons might allow the Shia to triumph in a civil war, but only through the indiscriminate use of firepower, with huge collateral damage. The U.S. should quietly help the Iraqis achieve a military stalemate. To do so, the U.S. may occasionally have to switch sides in the war, quietly supporting the weaker parties. U.S. intelligence operatives, Special Forces, and perhaps air power will be the key tools in this effort, along with supplies of money and arms. Such a strategy is facilitated if most U.S. forces leave the country; if they remain they are hostages to whichever side feels most betrayed.

Stalemate is the military outcome most conducive to an internal political settlement that does not risk regional war. In some civil wars, the quickest way to an end is for one side to win decisively. Unfortunately in Iraq, Sunni victory would probably draw in Iranian intervention, and Shia victory would probably draw in Arab intervention. Kurdish success might draw in the Turks. To avoid regional war, no side can be allowed a decisive victory.
It is important, however tragic, that the Iraqi factions bear most of the cost of their internal conflict, because only the experience of these costs, and the shared perception that they are open ended, can provide a foundation for compromise. It is possible that a clear prospect that these costs are imminent may focus the minds of Iraqi pragmatists of every stripe.

The U.S. effort in Iraq has at best achieved a dynamic stalemate. The U.S. seems out of tools to win the counter insurgency effort. Though the U.S. military has developed a better understanding of appropriate counter insurgency techniques and forces, commanders in the field seem to understand that the war can only be ended politically, by Iraqis. But the state-building project in Iraq proceeds slowly, and does not seem destined to produce sufficient success to de-energize the insurgents politically or defeat them militarily.

The current strategy is one of attrition. It may be sustainable, but the costs to the U.S. seem high. Moreover, the course of the U.S. effort within Iraq is not predictable. There is plenty of scope for dangerous events that would produce new and difficult challenges. These include an escalation of the current civil war including more and more obvious gross human rights violations than have already occurred; an unusually successful attack against U.S. forces within Iraq; or the assassination of key political figures inside the country.

The U.S. must develop a new strategy in Iraq, a strategy that engages regional and international political actors, places responsibility for Iraq on Iraqis, plays to U.S. military strengths, and takes the burden of this project off the shoulders of U.S. enlisted military personnel.

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A Balanced Foreign Policy

DARYL PRESS AND BENJAMIN VALENTINO

The United States has a broad range of interests in the world, including (1) protecting the U.S. homeland from attack, (2) promoting the U.S. economy by encouraging economic globalization, (3) supporting close allies who need our protection, and (4) encouraging the spread of democracy and human rights around the world. These are worthy goals, and the United States has pursued them for decades.

Unfortunately, America’s current foreign policy pursues these goals with the wrong mix of tools. A successful foreign policy should employ a balance of economic, diplomatic, and military tools to reach its goals, but the current policy relies too heavily on military force.

The results have been disastrous. Costly military campaigns and irresponsible fiscal policies threaten the long-term strength of our economy. Precious freedoms have been curtailed at home. Human rights abuses committed abroad have tarnished America’s image, even in the eyes of longtime allies.

We propose a balanced foreign policy. It employs military force when necessary—e.g., against terrorist groups or countries seeking to attack America. But it uses non-military means where they are more effective: e.g., spreading democracy, promoting human rights, and even slowing the spread of WMD.

The foreign policy we propose is ideally suited to the new international environment in the twenty-first century. America’s principal enemies are no longer powerful countries with large armies poised to conquer U.S. allies. Instead, today’s adversaries are weak countries and terrorist groups. Furthermore, modern technology allows the United States to project military power around the globe more rapidly than ever before. These two profound changes mean that the United States can protect its key interests—with decisive military force if necessary—without peacetime U.S. military deployments in hostile regions.
In its simplest form, a balanced foreign policy has four core elements:

- Use military force to deter and defeat adversaries who attack the U.S. or key allies.
- Use non-military tools to accomplish all other key foreign policy goals.
- Allow democracy and free markets to continue to spread around the world, propelled by their broad global appeal.
- Withdraw U.S. forces from hostile regions—particularly the Persian Gulf—and defend key U.S. interests with “over the horizon” military power.

The benefits of a balanced foreign policy are enormous. The United States can achieve its foreign policy goals at a fraction of the cost of the current policy. The savings can be directed to other pressing needs such as bolstering Social Security, reducing the deficit, investing in education and expanding health coverage. The other savings are greater: fewer Americans will die in wars, and the U.S. will again have a foreign policy that Americans and our allies can be proud to support.

**IMPLEMENTING A BALANCED FOREIGN POLICY:
KEY POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES**

**Defeat terrorism:**

1. Relentlessly pursue Al Qaeda—and all terrorist groups who harbor the intent to attack the United States—using every means available, including military force.
   - **Intensify** efforts against Al-Qaeda by avoiding unnecessary wars; they sap U.S. military and intelligence resources and strain relations with key allies in war on terror.

2. Terrorist groups who are not targeting America should be opposed, but not with military force.
   - Using military force against every rebel group diverts U.S. resources from our most dangerous foes, and embroils America in new disputes.
   - Combat these groups by sharing intelligence, freezing terrorists’ assets, and discrediting their violent methods and ideologies.
3. Reduce terrorism by addressing the problems that drive recruits to support radical Islamists.
   • U.S. polices in the Persian Gulf have even turned moderate Muslims against America.
   • Stop trying to spread democracy by force; end peacetime military presence in Persian Gulf.

4. Rebuild strained relations with key allies in war on terror.
   • Effective counter-terrorism requires international cooperation on intelligence.
   • Currently, even our closest European allies are reticent to cooperate publicly with the U.S.
   • Improve international reputation to maximize international assistance.

5. Enhance homeland security.
   • Improve security for airports, seaports, domestic nuclear and chemical facilities, high-profile subways, bridges, and tunnels, and computer networks.
   • Improve U.S. capability to respond to attacks by increasing investments in public health measures—such as vaccines and antibiotics against potential biological weapons—and by exercising existing response plans.

Withdraw from Iraq:

1. Withdraw U.S. military forces from Iraq within two years.
   • Each month of war weakens the U.S. military, drains the U.S. treasury, ties up resources needed to fight Al Qaeda, alienates important allies in the war on terror, and rallies new recruits to the cause of terrorism.
   • The United States has given the Iraqi people a chance to build a better society for themselves. Doing so will be difficult because of the sectarian divisions within Iraq. But it is now the responsibility of Iraqis to surmount their divisions, reach the power-sharing compromises necessary to build a unified Iraq, and chase out foreign terrorists.
• Allow Iraq to govern itself, provided it does not support terrorism or attack its neighbors.

Reduce U.S. role in the Persian Gulf region/promote energy independence:

1. The U.S. is currently dependent on Persian Gulf oil. There is a single global market for oil, so disruptions in the Middle East affect all oil consumers, even those who buy their oil elsewhere.

2. Ensuring U.S. access to oil does not require a peacetime U.S. military presence in the region: the U.S. can protect its energy interests with “over the horizon” military forces.
   • Major threats to U.S. access to Persian Gulf oil are: conquest of oil producing countries, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and an Islamist revolution in a major oil producer.
   • U.S. military forces can prevent the first two threats without being stationed in the region. Beefed up naval forces in the Indian Ocean can prevent conquest or closure of the Strait.
   • The third threat—the risk of Islamist revolution (e.g., in Saudi Arabia)—is exacerbated by the U.S. military presence in the region.

3. The U.S. should strive to reduce long-term dependence on the Persian Gulf by encouraging investment in research and technology that could reduce U.S. reliance on fossil fuels.

Prevent the spread of WMD:

1. Weapons of mass destruction pose a critical threat to America.

2. The U.S. should work to slow—and hopefully prevent—the spread of WMD.
   • Help Russia secure its stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
   • Cooperate with other countries and use international institutions to detect WMD programs, intercept the illicit trade in WMD technology, and impose sanctions where necessary.

3. When WMD proliferation occurs, respond with deterrence and sanctions, not preventive war.
• In most cases, military attacks against proliferators will fail. Locating and destroying WMD facilities is extremely difficult because adversaries hide, disperse, and bury them.

• If an adversary acquires WMD, the U.S. must deter the use or transfer of these weapons.

• National leaders—even North Korean recluses, Chinese communists, and Iranian clerics—fear the loss of political power and America’s vast retaliatory capabilities. The U.S. must issue a warning: misuse these weapons and you will be overthrown, conquered, or worse.

Manage China’s rise:

1. The United States should encourage China to become a friendly, cooperative member of the existing international order, and hedge against the possibility that China becomes a military rival.

• Encourage China to become a partner by integrating Beijing into key international institutions and encouraging trade and investment.

• Guard against the danger of a hostile China by husbanding U.S. economic resources, maintaining America’s edge in advanced military technologies, and building cooperative relationships with other Asian nations.

• If China becomes aggressive despite U.S. efforts to integrate Beijing into the current international order, it will be easy to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia because others in the region will then see China as a threat.

Maintain the world’s most powerful military:

1. The United States should continued to field the world’s most powerful military.

• The U.S. can afford the current defense budget, and it is sufficient to preserve America’s lead across all dimensions of military power.

• Major savings can still be achieved by foregoing costly U.S. military operations, which have cost in excess of $1 trillion. (on top of the defense budget).
• Recent operations have also stretched the active forces too thin and over-taxed the National Guard and Reserves.
• The best way to maintain U.S. military preeminence is a well-funded military that is used sparingly.

Promote American values abroad:

1. Democracy and free markets are spreading on their own because of their broad appeal.
   • Using force to spread democracy usually fails: the U.S. success rate is less than 25%.
   • Using force to spread democracy is counter-productive: it creates unnecessary enemies and discredits local advocates of U.S. values.
   • The U.S. should promote freedom abroad by vigilantly guarding U.S. freedoms at home.
   • The United States can inexpensively support those countries that are working to build their own democracy, develop a market economy, and protect human rights.

2. The U.S. should help alleviate human suffering in the poorest parts of the world.
   • Military interventions in times of humanitarian crises are expensive and usually ineffective.
   • There are better and less expensive ways to improve life for the world’s neediest people: vaccine programs, water treatment projects, and other global health initiatives are inexpensive and can have enormous near-term benefits.

Promote free markets:

1. The United States should promote the expansion of free markets within and between countries.
   • Free markets help the U.S. economy. When competition is free and fair, American businesses are highly competitive. American interests are threatened when markets are unfree—e.g., when cartels distort markets or countries enact unfair trade barriers.
   • Free markets give the U.S. diplomatic leverage since foreign nations seek access to U.S. markets.
• Free markets promote other U.S. values since economic freedom often opens the door to political freedom.

2. The U.S. should help developing countries establish the domestic infrastructure and policies necessary for markets to operate.

Protect the global environment and health:

1. Environmental degradation and pandemics pose the gravest long-term dangers to the U.S.

2. These threats can only be countered by intensive cooperation with other states and through advancements in the areas of clean energy and bio-medical technologies.

• Current policies have alienated potential partners in these international efforts and have failed to encourage the research needed to develop new sources of energy or new medical treatments for epidemics like the avian flu and SARS.

3. The U.S. must begin a major initiative to encourage these technological breakthroughs. Doing so will not only protect us from global warming and global pandemics, it will strengthen our economy by maintaining the U.S. lead in science and technology.

In sum, America’s current foreign policy relies too heavily on military force to promote U.S. interests. Although military force is sometimes necessary, U.S. policy should be balanced and rely more on America’s other tools of foreign policy—e.g., our unrivaled economy, and the global appeal of our values. Through a balanced foreign policy, the United States can achieve its important foreign policy goals, while reestablishing our country as a beacon of freedom and human rights, at a fraction of the costs of the current policy.

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On Every Front: A Strategy for the War on Terror

Stephen Van Evera

Al-Qaeda and its jihadi allies continue to pose a large threat to the United States. Al-Qaeda lost its base and saw its leadership isolated from its operatives when the U.S. ousted Afghanistan’s Taliban government in 2001–2002. But al-Qaeda addressed these setbacks by morphing into a decentralized but highly potent terrorist movement that remains capable of great destruction.

And great destruction is what al-Qaeda likely intends. Al-Qaeda’s leaders have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the past, and their rhetoric suggests that they would use these weapons if they had them. In 1998 Osama Bin Laden proclaimed that “to kill Americans . . . civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible.”¹ A former al-Qaeda press spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, even claimed that al-Qaeda had a right to kill four million Americans, including two million children.²

Such a grave menace requires a strong response. Yet the U.S. has so far waged only a one-dimensional war against al-Qaeda and its jihadi allies, fighting hard on one front when it should be fighting on four. Specifically, the Bush administration has focused heavily on an offensive campaign against al-Qaeda overseas while neglecting three other critical fronts: bolstering homeland defense, securing weapons and materials of mass destruction from possible theft or purchase by terrorists, and winning the war of ideas. And the administration has sometimes lost focus and done too little on the one front where it has been fighting, partly because it diverted itself into a costly and counterproductive sideshow in
Iraq. President Bush is widely credited for toughness on terror. In fact, however, his administration has pursued a half-hearted war on terror, failing to devote the political and financial resources it requires.

Instead the U.S. should wage a far stronger war on al-Qaeda. This war should be waged on every relevant front with all needed resources. Other policies should be oriented to serve this effort and judged in part on their contribution to it. The U.S. should do this because al-Qaeda is the greatest threat that the United States now faces and failure to defeat it could bring immense calamity.

FRONT NO. 1: THE OFFENSIVE

The Bush administration has focused on denying al-Qaeda sanctuaries overseas—by destroying or deterring regimes that shelter al-Qaeda—and on rolling up al-Qaeda’s global organization through intelligence and police work. The centerpiece of this offensive was the 2001 smashing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had sheltered al-Qaeda. This was an important success as it denied al-Qaeda secure access to large training bases and severed communications between al-Qaeda leaders and their global network.

Yet even this offensive element of the Bush strategy did not fully succeed because it was under-resourced and sometimes poorly led. American forces allowed the al-Qaeda top command to escape at the battle of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in late 2001. A later operation, Anaconda, also ended badly because too few American forces were committed. And ensuing allied efforts to stabilize Afghanistan were half-hearted: needed security and economic aid was not provided. As a result al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have re-established a strong presence in southern and eastern Afghanistan and in nearby Pakistan. Pakistan itself remains unstable and cannot police its Northwest Frontier Province, allowing al-Qaeda free run of the area.

Things have also deteriorated in Somalia, where radical Islamists with ties to al-Qaeda have gained control of Mogadishu after defeating U.S.-backed warlords in June 2006.

The weakness of the Bush administration’s offensive against al-Qaeda stems partly from the administration’s decision to attack Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. The Iraq war diverted resources away from the war on al-Qaeda. For example, operation Anaconda in Afghanistan
failed partly because needed U.S. troops were withheld from the battle to conserve them for the coming war with Iraq. The Iraq war also inflamed the Muslim world against the U.S. The counter-insurgent character of the U.S. intervention is especially calamitous. A counter-insurgency presents a gruesome spectacle to onlookers. It is inherently brutal and cruel. By falling into the role of counter-insurgent in Iraq the Bush administration has damaged America’s position far beyond Iraq and given al-Qaeda a big boost.

Thus even on the offensive, its favored mission, the Bush team has shown an uncertain hand and allowed itself to be distracted from its objective.

**FRONT NO. 2: THE DEFENSIVE**

The Bush administration’s homeland defense effort has large holes. It has increased funding for homeland security functions since 9/11 but should do much more. The FBI remains focused on crime solving, not terror prevention. Local law enforcement, a front line in the war, has not been fully engaged in the struggle against terror. The U.S. government still has no single, coordinated national watch list of terror suspects. Such a list is a basic and essential tool of counter-terrorism. Yet the United States instead maintains several different watch lists, feeding confusion among security personnel on the front lines.

U.S. nuclear reactors and chemical plants remain vulnerable and inviting targets for terrorists. Clever attacks on these reactors and plants could kill tens of thousands or more. U.S. ports remain open to devastating attack. U.S. biodefenses have been strengthened but the U.S. remains vulnerable to bioterror. U.S. insurance laws governing terror give businesses little incentive to harden their infrastructure against an attack. U.S. borders remain essentially open.

The CIA has been damaged by a campaign against CIA employees who were deemed unfriendly to the Bush administration. This campaign caused an exodus of able officers from the CIA when their expertise was badly needed.

This situation reflects the administration’s decision to focus its efforts on the offensive while doing only enough on homeland security to give the appearance of action. At this point homeland security is more a palliative to public fear than a real security program.
Vast nuclear and biological weapons and materials remain poorly secured in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Enough nuclear materials remain poorly secured in Russia to make tens of thousands of Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs. Many Soviet nuclear and biological-weapons scientists also remain underpaid or unemployed, ripe for hiring by terrorists. Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have all failed to move strongly to lock down these materials and scientists. The U.S. spends only some $1.3 billion per year on the project (through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, or CTR) and will not have it finished for years. The CTR program lacks a strong, visible leader who can make things happen in Washington and Moscow. Duck and cover! This policy lapse is among the worst failures of government in modern times.

Funding for CTR should be tripled. And a strong political figure—a James Baker type—should be put in charge of the effort. The President should empower this leader to use the full array of American carrots and sticks to get results from Russia’s President Putin.

A strong-handed approach should also be taken toward securing WMD around the rest of the world, including poorly secured nuclear materials in Pakistan and in scores of research reactors elsewhere. During the Cold War the U.S. unwisely dispersed enough nuclear material to make perhaps 1,000 nuclear bombs to 43 countries around the world, starting in the 1950s and ending in 1988. The U.S. government has since made only lackadaisical efforts to recover these very dangerous materials, which are ripe for theft or illicit purchase by terrorists. These materials must be secured immediately.

To defeat al-Qaeda the U.S. must reach a modus vivendi with the wider Muslim world. The Islamist jihadi movement from which al-Qaeda grows must be reduced, isolated, and drained of energy. This requires changing the terms of debate in the Muslim world. The jihadis feed on political and historical myths and lies, and also on anger stemming from political and social realities in the Mideast, especially the Israel-Palestinian conflict. These myths must be dispelled by strong U.S. public diplomacy, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be dampened by a strong new U.S. push for peace.
Public diplomacy. The al-Qaeda recruiting narrative is a farrago of historical fabrications and half-truths. Al-Qaeda portrays the last century as a period of vast unprovoked one-way violence by the U.S. and other non-Muslim states against a benign Muslim world that was innocent of wrongdoing. If this narrative were true it would indeed justify Muslim rage. The crimes of the West would cry out for a punishing response.

But violence has in fact run both ways between non-Muslims and Muslims. Western states have committed great cruelties, including horrific barbarism by France, Britain, and Italy in their efforts to subdue colonies in Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere; the 1953 U.S. coup in Iran; and a cynical U.S. policy toward Afghanistan during 1989–1992 that left it in flames. On the other hand, Muslim Sudan’s government has slaughtered two million non-Muslim South Sudanese since 1983, and it supported the murderous Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.10 Muslim Indonesia murdered 200,000 Christian East Timorese during 1975–2000 and 400,000–500,000 of its non-Muslim Chinese minority in 1965. Muslim Turkey massacred 600,000–1,500,000 Christian Armenians in 1895 and 1915, in one of the great genocides of modern times.11 Thus the recent history of Muslim-non-Muslim relations is one of great crimes committed by both sides. Both should confess their crimes, hang their heads in shame and ask forgiveness.

Muslims, especially the Islamist extremists, also have much Muslim blood on their own hands. These crimes include the slaughter of several hundred thousand Muslims in Darfur by Sudan’s Islamist government since 2003, the killing of many thousand Afghan Muslims by the Taliban during its bloody rule, and the killing of tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims by the violent Algerian Islamist movement, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), during 1992–1998. These crimes put the lie to extreme Islamists’ claims of concern for the welfare of fellow Muslims. The extreme Islamists should atone for these crimes before seeking vengeance for the crimes of others against Muslims.

Some of the western crimes cited by the jihadis are invented. In the jihadi narrative the U.S. interventions in Somalia (1992–94), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) are painted as violent predations against Muslim populations. This portrayal grossly distorts the historical record. The U.S. committed serious mistakes in these interventions but it intervened in each case to assist Muslims, not to harm them. Its intervention
in Bosnia and Kosovo ended Serb violence against those Muslim-majority populations and its intervention in Somalia saved over 40,000 Muslim Somali lives.

In short the jihadi narrative leaves much to debate and correct. Muslim rage would be deflated if Muslims understood this. But U.S. efforts to correct the record are half-hearted. The books, articles and media products one would expect to be produced in a serious war of ideas are not appearing. Missing are films of interviews with the hundreds of African victims maimed by al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Missing are documentaries on the murderous cruelty of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Islamist government in Sudan against their Muslim citizens. A handful of film makers could produce these quickly but the administration is not interested. As a result of such failures grotesque and malignant misperceptions persist in the Muslim world. For example, large majorities in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia still do not believe that groups of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. U.S. efforts to destroy al-Qaeda cannot succeed while such attitudes endure.

U.S. public diplomacy is failing because the Bush team has put only scant resources into it. In FY 2003 the U.S. government spent only some $1.14 billion on the public diplomacy function, and in FY 2006 it spent only about $1.36 billion. Only $150 million of the State Department’s FY 2003 public diplomacy money was spent in Muslim-majority countries. These are paltry sums relative to the task at hand.

This failure in turn reflects the Bush administration’s macho approach to foreign policy. It believes that friends abroad are won by using the mailed fist. Allies are gained by instilling fear, not respect. The Caligula theory of statecraft—”let them hate us as long as they fear us”—is believed and applied. Reasoning with others is assumed to be pointless, as others are immoral cowards who understand only threat of force. Public diplomacy is for sissies. This school-yard bully attitude has led the administration into serious mistakes. The United States has powerful skills of persuasion but the Bush team has failed to use them.

Will the Islamic world engage in debate about historical truth? Will it agree that it must rest its claims on valid history? The Koran says it must. “Believers, if an evil-doer brings you a piece of news, inquire first into its truth, lest you should wrong others unwittingly and then regret your action.” The United States should embrace this teaching and propose
that both sides fully live by it. This would require that both agree to
enquire about and debate the truth of history.

The Arab-Israel conflict. To win the war of ideas the U.S. must move
credibly toward a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This con-

flict inflames Arabs and Muslims against the United States.\(^{18}\)

To move toward peace Washington should frame its own final-status
peace plan and use carrots and sticks to persuade both sides to agree.
This will put the opponents of peace on both sides on the defensive.
Most important, it will corner the radical Palestinian group Hamas by
exposing its extremism as an obstacle to a just peace. Most Palestinians
now want a two-state solution. Hamas, which won Palestinian parlia-
mentary elections in January 2006, rejects a two-state solution and
instead seeks Israel’s destruction. It has argued that its extremism does
little harm to its followers because the two-state solution that its extrem-
ism prevents was never in the cards. The U.S. can destroy this argument
by making clear that it will lead matters to just such a peace if the two
sides will cooperate. Hamas will then be forced to bend toward peace or
lose power.

The U.S. final-status plan should involve a near-full Israeli with-
drawal in exchange for full and final peace, in line with the four major
peace plans that have been widely discussed in recent years: the Clinton
bridging proposals of December 2000, the Abdullah Plan of March
2002, the Geneva Accord of December 2003, and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh
initiative, also of December 2003. Polls show majorities on both sides
favoring these terms. This gives the U.S. a lot to work with if it wants to
push peace forward.

Dampen other conflicts. Al-Qaeda feeds on war. It exploits any war
involving Muslims anywhere in the world by painting the Muslims as
victims, whether or not they are, and publicizing their suffering. It
exploits in this fashion current wars in Kashmir and Chechnya and past
wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian
war. Accordingly the U.S should have a policy of dampening conflict and
promoting peace in Kashmir and Chechnya, as well as in Israel-Palestine.
As al-Qaeda feeds on war, so the United States should be the great maker
and builder of peace in the region.\(^{19}\)
AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGY

The Bush administration advanced its own framework for strategy in its 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. In this scheme the U.S. would define and then deny the inputs that terrorist organizations require to sustain themselves and their operations. Nine key inputs are identified: (1) Leadership; (2) Safe-havens for training and planning; (3) Funds and finance; (4) Communications, needed for exerting command and control over operatives and for inspiring a broader political base; (5) Movement, needed for gaining access to targets, especially in the United States; (6) Intelligence, needed to make strategy, to plan operations, and to plan countermeasures against attack; (7) Weapons, including WMD; (8) Personnel, supplied by the recruitment, training and indoctrination of new operatives; and (9) Ideological support, needed to recruit and motivate new operatives and to gain broader support from host societies.

This scheme is an intelligent alternative to the four-front scheme that I used above. It is tied directly to the logic of terrorist organizational sustenance. This makes it especially useful for identifying tactics that will defeat terrorist networks.

However, the Bush policy against al-Qaeda looks inadequate when measured against this scheme as well. The administration is moving firmly against only four vulnerabilities (numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5—al-Qaeda leadership, al-Qaeda safe-havens, and al-Qaeda ability to communicate and move). The strategy is good but the effort is poor.

NEEDED: LARGE POLICY INNOVATION

Winning the war on terror will require large innovation in U.S. national security policy. The U.S. should put relatively less resources into traditional military functions—army, navy, air force—and far more resources into counterterror functions. These include intelligence, homeland security, diplomacy to lock down loose nukes and bioweapons around the world, public diplomacy, diplomacy to end conflicts that breed terror—including the Israeli-Arab conflict and the conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya—and nation building and saving failed states, to deny terrorists the haven-states they need to build their organizations. But the organizations that carry out these functions are politically weak in Washington, so they lose out in Washington budget battles. And like all
governments the U.S. government resists innovation, so the changes needed to defeat al-Qaeda face large political obstacles. Can the U.S. government innovate to the extent required?

Americans should want to hear the pulling and hauling of vast turf fights in Washington. This would tell them that resources and authority were being transferred from yesterday’s Cold-War-oriented agencies to Counterterror-oriented agencies.

Instead the tenor of national security policy in Washington is largely business-as-usual. The agencies that would lead in a serious war on al-Qaeda still take a far back seat to the military services. Specifically, in 2006 the U.S. spent $454 billion for the military services and their support. Meanwhile the U.S. spent only $40 billion on homeland security in 2006. And, as I noted above, in 2006 the U.S. spent only $1.31 on locking down loose nuclear weapons and materials through the CTR and $1.36 billion on public diplomacy. Thus U.S. military spending was 11 times U.S. spending on homeland security, 347 times U.S. spending on locking down nuclear weapons and materials, and 334 times U.S. spending on the war of ideas. The U.S. is like a midget with a strong right arm: powerful in one regard but only one.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which frames the plan for future U.S. military programs, is little changed from the Cold War-era. It still recommends spending vast sums on super-high-tech tactical fighters and killer submarines that now have no enemy to fight and little role against al-Qaeda. The innovation that victory against al-Qaeda requires is not underway.

CONCLUSION: NEEDED BUT STILL MISSING: A STRONG COUNTERTERROR POLICY

Before the 9/11 al-Qaeda attack the Bush administration took the terror threat lightly. On taking office in January 2001 the administration downgraded the government’s chief counterterror officer, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, to a non-cabinet level position. The President’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, belittled the al-Qaeda threat in April 2001, only five months before the 9/11 attack, wondering in a meeting “why we are beginning by talking about this one man, bin Laden,” and offering the grossly incorrect assertion that Iraq was at least as active in terrorism as bin Laden. President Bush himself dismissed a CIA briefer who warned in August 2001 of an
impending al-Qaeda attack, telling him “you’ve covered your ass, now.” When marked indications of a terror attack were detected in early summer 2001 the administration failed to call the government to alert status—unlike the Clinton administration, which called a government alert in late 1999 on receiving warning of the al-Qaeda Millennium plot (which it thwarted). In fact the administration failed even to hold a meeting of cabinet principals to consider the terror threat until September 4, 2001, despite urgent pleas beginning in January 2001 for a meeting from Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

The 9/11 attack should have cured the administration of its torpor toward terror, but the evidence reviewed here indicates that its lassitude persists. The administration talks tough on terror but is not devoting the resources or forcing the innovations that a strong policy requires. Its bark is fearsome but its bite is mild.

Instead the U.S. should devote the full energy required to defeat al-Qaeda. This requires action on every relevant front and large policy innovation. The U.S. should also avoid further diversions from the campaign against the main enemy—the al-Qaeda network and other jihadi terrorists. For example, a military confrontation with Syria or Iran—urged by some in Washington—would be a grave mistake. Washington must keep its eye on the ball.

Al-Qaeda poses the single greatest danger to U.S. national security and defeating it must be America’s top priority. Pursuing this priority and the innovation that it requires will surely make America safer.

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NOTES


8. For details on U.S. policy toward nuclear materials security see Allison, *Avoiding Nuclear Terror: 143–50, 177; Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005*; and resources at the Nuclear Threat Initiative website (www.nti.org) and the Managing the Atom website (www.managingtheatom.org).


13. Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel Says,” New York Times, October 1, 2003. This figure includes $600 million spent by the State Department on its worldwide public diplomacy activities and $540 million spent by the Broadcasting Board of Governors on broadcasts.


15. Weisman, “U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World.”


19. My argument is from Stephanie Kaplan, who argues in a forthcoming MIT political science Ph.D. dissertation that war is a tonic for terrorist propaganda-making, recruiting, network-building, and training, and thus serves as a general breeding ground for terrorists. She concludes that war prevention and war termination should be a centerpiece of U.S. counterterror policy.


spending on national defense (the 050 federal budget account) in 2006 was $463 billion. Of this, $8 billion went to non-military security assistance and about $1 billion went to counterproliferation activities, including CTR. The remaining $454 billion went to the military services and their support. See also Cindy Williams, “National Security Budgets to Make America Safer,” in this volume, Table 1.

22. Ibid. This figure omits spending on security for Defense Department installations in the U.S.


25. Clarke, Against All Enemies: 231–32.


Budgets to Make America Safer

Cindy Williams

Since September 2001, federal budgets for national security have climbed more than 50 percent in real terms. Unfortunately, much of the added money reflects “business as usual” rather than programs aimed at making the nation safer from today’s threats.

Compared with past decades, national security spending makes up a relatively small share of the U.S. economy. Nevertheless, with the federal debt growing rapidly and as large numbers of baby boomers approach retirement age, many observers expect future federal budgets to be tight. Thus it is critically important to ensure that national security funds go to projects that make the nation more secure.

When it comes to making the nation secure, policy makers have a choice of tools at their disposal, including nonmilitary international measures and homeland security as well as the military. Compared with the military, investments in the nonmilitary tools of national security can be a financial bargain. For example, as Matthew Bunn discusses in his article, the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program has already greatly improved global security prospects by locking up or destroying vast quantities of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. At a cost of about one billion dollars a year, the program is a real bargain compared with our $10 billion annual investment in missile defenses that have failed many of their tests. Because the nonmilitary programs are a relative bargain, and because they solve problems and open opportunities for which the military tool is poorly suited, it is crucial that policy makers become more explicit about tradeoffs across the range of national security tools, and that we begin to shift some resources away from military tools and toward the nonmilitary ones.

This article examines broad changes in national security budgets since September 2001. It first reviews the three categories of federal
spending for national security. It then examines how budgets in those categories have changed since September 2001. It ends with a look at alternatives that seem more relevant in an era of international mass-casualty terrorism.

THREE WAYS TO IMPROVE SECURITY

Three categories of federal spending are closely related to national security. The first is national defense—the offensive element. National defense includes funds for the Department of Defense (DoD), nuclear activities of the Department of Energy, and smaller military-related programs in other agencies. The national defense budget pays to raise, equip, train, and maintain the armed forces, conduct military operations, and deter attacks on the United States and its allies. It also pays about 80 percent of the nation’s intelligence bills.

The second category is homeland security—the defensive element. This category includes law enforcement to track down terrorists and bring them to justice, border and aviation security, physical and cyber protection of critical facilities and systems, improvements to the public health infrastructure, and preparations to respond to and mitigate the consequences of attacks should they occur.

The third category is international affairs—the preventive element. International affairs includes the conduct of foreign affairs and diplomacy through the State Department, economic and military aid to foreign countries, contributions to international organizations like the United Nations, and foreign information and exchange programs.

The Bush administration’s national security strategy calls for bringing to bear all the tools of statecraft and security, including elements of offense, defense, and prevention. Of course, no simple formula can tell U.S. leaders how spending should be divided among the three categories. National security policy serves multiple objectives: protecting U.S. sovereignty and territorial integrity and sustaining a suitable level of relative power in the world, as well as keeping people and infrastructure safe from the threat of direct attack. To those ends, the United States needs a strong military, regardless of the terrorist threat. It also devoted efforts to homeland security even before the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Moreover, even if terrorism were not a problem, international diplomacy and aid programs would be crucial to sustaining national security.
Achieving U.S. security objectives in the future will require continued substantial investment across all three categories. Nevertheless, U.S. resources for national security are not inexhaustible. Setting priorities and explicitly considering tradeoffs among the competing demands of offense, defense, and prevention are crucial for the nation to get the most out of its sizeable financial investment in security.

**NATIONAL SECURITY SPENDING SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001**

Between 2001 and 2006, annual budget authority for national security (including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) rose by 80 percent in nominal terms and more than 50 percent after adjusting for inflation (see Table 1). The national defense budget grew by about 50 percent in real terms. Homeland security experienced the largest percentage rise, nearly tripling in real terms. Much of that increase occurred within DoD, however, in part due to recent accounting changes; homeland security spending outside DoD grew by a factor of 2.5. International affairs budgets grew by nearly 40 percent in real terms.

Across the three categories, national security budgets for fiscal year 2006 come to $631 billion, more in real terms than at any time in at least five decades. As in 2001, the lion’s share goes to the offensive element. In 2006, the federal government will spend about 14 times as much for offense as for defense, and about 17 times as much for offense as for prevention. One possible reason for such disparities is that defense and prevention are inherently less expensive than offense. If that is the case, then modest investments in those areas should yield greater payoff than marginal added investments in offense.

**MUCH OF THE RISE IN SPENDING IS UNRELATED TO FIGHTING TERRORISM**

Unfortunately, much of the post-9/11 real increase in national security budgets goes not to make the United States safer from the threat of catastrophic terrorism, but to operations in Iraq and business as usual in the Department of Defense. Of the $280 billion nominal increase from 2001 to 2006, the largest single share—some $97 billion—goes for military operations in Iraq. The Bush administration argues that the war in Iraq is a necessary element of the fight against terrorism. Yet the existence of weapons of mass destruction or of prewar links between Iraq
and Al Qaeda have not been demonstrated, casting doubt on the importance of the war to countering terrorism.

More than $50 billion of the budget rise goes to increased investment in military equipment. Unfortunately, much of that money is not for the exploration of new technologies that might help to counter today’s threats, but for technically troubled missile defense systems and for ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles better suited to conventional combat. Budgets for science and technology—the basic and applied research and development funding that was cut during the Cold War—are too small to provide the types of technological breakthroughs that are needed today. This is why the military calls for greater investment in innovation, yet at the same time do not pay for the research and development necessary to make these breakthroughs happen.

Table 1. Budgets for National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Authority (Billions of Current Dollars)</th>
<th>2001a</th>
<th>2006 Estimateb</th>
<th>2007 Requestc</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Defense</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Iraq and Afghanistan</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total National Defense</strong></td>
<td>318</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>513</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Homeland Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Homeland Security</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homeland Security Spending in DoD</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td><strong>Homeland Security Net of DoD</strong></td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Affairs</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>351</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Sources: Author’s calculations based on Office of Management and Budget, Congressional Budget Office, and Congressional Research Service documents. Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

a 2001 figures exclude post-9/11 emergency supplemental appropriations.

b 2006 figures include the annual appropriation for fiscal year 2006 and the emergency supplemental appropriation signed by President Bush on June 15, 2006. The homeland security estimate for 2006 includes $1.2 billion in supplemental funds for border security activities outside DoD and $0.7 billion for border security activities involving the National Guard within DoD, but excludes $2.3 billion allocated by the supplemental appropriation for avian flu preparedness as well as money allocated in the supplemental for disaster relief, community and economic development, and other funding related to the 2005 hurricanes. The international affairs estimate for 2006 includes $3 billion for Iraq and $1 billion for Afghanistan in the emergency supplemental appropriation.

c The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes a “bridge fund” of $50 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This table allocates the entire $50 billion bridge fund to Iraq. Absent a major drawdown of forces early in fiscal year 2007, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to require emergency supplemental funding on the order of $70 billion, in addition to the $50 billion bridge fund included here.
advanced technology work that could lead to systems better suited to the new strategic environment—barely kept pace with inflation.

A large share of the post-9/11 rise in DoD’s budget is for military pay and benefits, which climbed by about $40 billion, largely because of entitlement expansions granted in 1999 and 2000 for service members and military retirees. Unfortunately, much of the new spending for military compensation will not make the nation safer. Pay raises for the men and women who are in uniform today may help the military compete as an employer in American labor markets as the Iraq war drains enthusiasm for service. But the billions of dollars in new entitlements for military retirees will do nothing for the 85 percent of service-members who leave the military before becoming eligible for them; such entitlements will do virtually nothing to help the military compete as an employer.

About $40 billion of the $280 billion increase in annual spending is devoted to homeland security, the defensive component. A healthy share of that money, however, is for protection of facilities and forces inside DoD. The rise in homeland security spending outside DoD contributed just $27 billion to the $280 billion increase. Including funds added through the 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation, roughly $11 billion of that rise goes to improvements in border and transportation security. Another $4 billion goes toward emergency preparedness and response, much of it for grants to state and local governments to improve public health capacity or to prepare and equip local first responders. Only a few billion dollars of the increase go toward non-DoD research and development into technologies for homeland security. In particular, just $1.8 billion of the increase goes toward developing medical countermeasures to chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological threats; a scant $300 million pays for crucial research and development into technologies to detect and report on nuclear and radiological materials.

Funding for international affairs, the preventive element, accounts for only $12 billion of the $280 billion increase in national security budgets between 2001 and 2006. Some $2 billion of that is for President Bush’s Global HIV/AIDS initiative. Another $1.8 billion is for the Millennium Challenge Account, a program started by President Bush in 2002 to help certain developing nations improve their capacity for economic growth. Some $4 billion, included in the emergency supplemental appropriation of June 2006, is to defray the wartime costs of the State
Department’s embassy in Baghdad, improve security, economic, and political conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and assist allies in the Middle East. In addition, a share of the new international affairs money goes to help U.S. allies in the fight against terrorism, including Afghanistan, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian Republics.

REALLOCATING RESOURCES TO PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY

Reallocation even relatively small amounts of the money devoted to offense could go a long way toward bolstering either prevention or defense. For example, for just half of the $10.4 billion DoD plans to spend on missile defense programs in fiscal year 2007, the nation could triple spending for port security (planned at $2 billion) and double spending to recapitalize the Coast Guard (planned at $935 million). For what DoD spends on Iraq each month (currently about $8 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service), the federal government could double planned FY 2007 spending for emergency preparedness and response ($5.5 billion), nuclear detection ($536 million), medical countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats ($2 billion), and enhancements to FEMA’s alert and early warning systems ($70 million).

Alternatively, for the $2.8 billion the administration plans to invest in F-22 fighter planes built for dogfights with Soviet aircraft that were never produced, the nation could nearly double the administration’s planned 2007 budget for Millennium Challenge. For the $3.7 billion now allocated to the Army’s technologically risky, increasingly costly Future Combat System, the nation could double foreign information and exchange activities ($1.2 billion), double efforts to halt proliferation of nuclear materials and knowledge ($1.2 billion), and still have money left over to improve resources for diplomacy ($6 billion). Such shifts would better deliver on the administration’s promise to use all the tools available to make the nation more secure. Even small shifts of funding from offense into defense and prevention could go a long way toward making the nation more secure.

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NOTES

1. Federal spending for homeland security is divided among numerous agencies, with the Department of Homeland Security receiving about one-half of the total funding. Unlike national defense and international affairs, homeland security is not tracked as a function in federal budgets. From 1999 to 2003, spending for homeland security and combating terrorism were tracked by the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in an annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. More recently, OMB reports homeland security funds in the budget's Analytical Perspectives. State and local governments and business firms play a role in homeland security; thus federal costs understate the total cost to the nation.


6. At today’s rates of spending, the Coast Guard’s program to replace aging aircraft, vessels, and support systems will take 20–25 years.
Counterterrorism will be a top concern of any future administration. Unfortunately, though the criticism of the Bush administration’s policies is heated, critics have not offered serious alternatives. This paper tries to build on the strong points of the Bush administration’s approach while offering alternatives for areas where it is wanting.

WHAT IS U.S. POLICY?

The U.S. strategy for fighting terrorism is both shifting and vague, but five elements stand out:

- First, the U.S. seeks to destroy and disrupt al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, commonly through the use of intelligence and law enforcement services.
- Second, the U.S. opposes states that sponsor terrorists or offer them sanctuary. Uncooperative regimes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, will be coerced, or if necessary toppled.
- Third, there is a particular effort to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
- Fourth, the U.S. has begun a relatively weak but by historical standards significant effort to promote democracy in the Middle East.
- Finally, much of counterterrorism policy is now bound up in Iraq.
HOW TO DO BETTER

The Bush administration has scored several important successes, particularly in the toppling of the Taliban and the global intelligence and law enforcement effort against al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. The U.S. should expand cooperation with allied security services and improve its defenses to contain the terrorists while using military force to bolster these measures. In the long-term, the terrorists’ own weaknesses will come to the fore—something we can encourage by working to delegitimate them as well. Within this overarching framework, the U.S. should look at six “fronts” that are vital to success.

1. Intelligence
It is a cliché that intelligence is at the core of successful counterterrorism but, like many clichés, it needs nuance when applied in practice.

- The brouhaha over the lack of U.S. assets (e.g. a spy in Bin Ladin’s inner circle) has created unrealistic expectations about what intelligence can accomplish against terrorist groups.
- Most valuable intelligence assets will be controlled by liaison partners in the Muslim world. U.S. operations that risk this cooperation should be avoided.
- The priority for U.S. intelligence should be coordinating allied activity and ensuring that the information they provide us is complete and accurate.
- The Bush administration’s prioritization of the nexus between counterterrorism and WMD should be continued. Pakistan should be given particular scrutiny.

2. Military
A primary military role is to prevent the emergence of another Taliban-type sponsor, particularly one such as Pakistan that has access to nuclear weapons or Saudi Arabia which controls a critical resource and has considerable wealth. Targeted killings are also an appropriate use of military force, though they should be used sparingly. Training allies for counterinsurgency is also vital given the role insurgencies play in the global jihadist movement. Limited military strikes usually fail and often backfire. Attacks in 1986 on Libya and in 1998 on Afghanistan worsened terrorism.
3. Diplomacy
Allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. For purposes of the war on terrorism, the most important new partners are India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen also are newly important. Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey remain important allies, while China, Japan, and South Korea all matter less than before when the U.S. focus is on al-Qa’ida and its affiliates.

- Much of this cooperation will not have the degree of institutionalization that characterized alliances like NATO during the Cold War.
- Efforts to strengthen local regimes’ counterterrorism capacities may inhibit democratic reform.
- U.S. cooperation with allies involved in their own struggles with Islamist groups will incur the opprobrium associated with their unpopular measures, such as Israel’s activities in Palestine and Russia’s repression in Chechnya.

4. Homeland Defense
U.S. homeland defense is poorly coordinated internally and not well integrated into the rest of the national security bureaucracy. Much of the spending is merely pork-barrel politics masquerading as security.

- A first step is to develop broad agreement on which targets will be protected and the methodology for evaluating tradeoffs. Right now, the U.S. does not focus carefully on targeting from a jihadi perspective.
- A homeland information strategy is vital. Far more economic (and perhaps human) damage may be done in the reaction to an attack than the attack itself.

5. Democratic Reform
Democratic reform has some benefits for counterterrorism, but it can weaken regimes while simultaneously empowering anti-U.S. forces.

- For now, the U.S. should build institutions and strengthen pro-U.S. voices.
- If a country is undergoing a democratic transformation (e.g. Indonesia), the U.S. should strive to support it, as the risks of failure can be considerable.
6. War of Ideas
The U.S. effort to win over Muslim (particularly Arab) hearts and minds has failed singularly.

• Rather than trying to build up America’s image, we should undertake the easier and more productive task of tearing down the jihadists.

• The U.S. should emphasize local themes and give more control to country teams in Embassies: what works in Morocco may not work in Indonesia.

7. Iraq
The Bush administration argues that the U.S. presence in Iraq diverts terrorists from attacking the U.S. homeland, that success in Iraq would foster good governance that would decrease terrorism in general, and that al-Qa’ida affiliates would control Iraq if the U.S. departed. All these arguments are at best overstated and at worse flat wrong.

In reality, Iraq is a no-win situation for the broader struggle against terrorism. Each day the U.S. stays in Iraq is a boon for al-Qa’ida and the broader jihadist movement. A U.S. withdrawal that left Iraq in chaos, however, would also be a boon for al-Qa’ida: it would allow the jihadists to claim a great victory and, more importantly, risks recreating a large haven for the movement and allows them to strike Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other states in the region.

The most feasible approach that would entail realistic and tolerable sacrifices for the U.S. may be a limited drawdown, with the U.S. retaining a small conventional force presence (much of which could be deployed outside Iraq) and a significant covert and training capability.

• Much of this presence would be focused on containing the jihadists in Iraq.

• The U.S. must also hedge against the possibility that unrest will spread beyond Iraq.

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Throughout history, the rise of a new power has been attended by uncertainty and anxieties. Often, though not always, violent conflict has followed. As Thucydides explained, the real roots of the Peloponnesian war were the rise in the power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta. The rise in the economic and military power of China, the world’s most populous country, will be one of the two or three most important questions for American foreign policy in this century.

Many observers have compared the rise of China to that of Germany at the beginning of the last century. For Arthur Waldron, “sooner or later, if present trends continue, war is probable in Asia. . . . China today is actively seeking to scare the United States away from East Asia rather as Germany sought to frighten Britain before World War I by building its ‘risk fleet.’” According to Robert Kagan, “the Chinese leadership views the world today in much the same way Kaiser Wilhelm II did a century ago....Chinese leaders chafe at the constraints on them and worry that they must change the rules of the international system before the international system changes them.”

This year China’s economy will grow by nearly 10 per cent and it has announced a 14.7 per cent increase in its defense spending. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has questioned China’s expenditures, and the Pentagon’s recent Quadrennial Defense Review identified China as a problem. Yet Chinese leaders have spoken of China’s “peaceful rise” or more recently, “peaceful development.”

Analysts like John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago have flatly proclaimed that China cannot rise peacefully, and predicted that “the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.” Others, like Ashley
Tellis, point out that China has engaged in good neighbor policies since the 1990s, settled border disputes, played a greater role in international institutions and recognized the benefits of using soft power. Skeptics reply that China is just waiting for its economy to continue to lay the basis for future hegemony, and that its goal is to expel the United States from Asia, and replace us as the global leader.

Who is right? We will not know for some time, but the debaters should recall both halves of Thucydides’ trenchant analysis. War was caused not merely by the rise of one power, but by the fear it engendered in another. The belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes. Each side, believing it will end up at war with the other, makes reasonable military preparations which then are read by the other side as confirmation of its worst fears. In a perversely transnational alliance, hawks in each country cite the others’ statements as clear evidence. A recent poll reports that one-third of Americans believe that China will “soon dominate the world,” while 54 percent see the emergence of China as a “threat to world peace.” One way to make America safer is to avoid such exaggerated fears and self-fulfilling prophecies.

THE RISE OF CHINA

In fact, the “rise of China” is a misnomer. “Re-emergence” would be more accurate, since by size and history the Middle Kingdom has long been a major power in East Asia. Technically and economically, China was the world’s leader (though without global reach) from 500 to 1500. Only in the last half millennium was it overtaken by Europe and America. The Asian Development Bank has calculated that in 1820, at the beginning of the industrial age, Asia made up an estimated three-fifths of world product. By 1940, this fell to one-fifth, even though the region was home to three-fifths of world population. Rapid economic growth has brought that back to two-fifths today, and the Bank speculates that Asia could return to its historical levels by 2025. Asia, of course, includes Japan, India, Korea and others, but China will eventually play the largest role. Its high annual growth rates of 8 to 9 percent led to a remarkable tripling of its GNP in the last two decades of the 20th century. This pragmatic economic performance, along with its Confucian culture, enhanced China’s soft power in the region. A recent poll of 33 countries conducted for the BBC, found China’s influence rated positively in 20 countries while the U.S. was rated positively in just 13 countries.
Nonetheless, China has a long way to go, and still faces many obstacles to its development. Measured by official exchange rates (a more accurate measure of power than is the World Bank’s purchasing power parity estimates), China is the fourth largest economy in the world and is growing at 9 per cent annually, but its income per capita is only $1,700 or one twenty-fifth that of the United States. China’s research and development is only ten per cent of the American level. If both the U.S. and China continue to grow at their current rates, it is possible that China’s total economy could be larger than ours in thirty years, but American per capita income (which is a better gauge of the sophistication of an economy) will remain four times greater. In addition, China’s military power is far behind ours, and it lacks the soft power resources such as Hollywood and world class universities that America enjoys. In contrast, the Kaiser’s Germany had already passed Great Britain in industrial production by 1900, and launched a serious military challenge to Britain’s naval supremacy. The historical analogy misreads history, as well as exaggerates China’s strength.

Moreover, simple linear projections of economic growth trends can be misleading. Countries tend to pick the low hanging fruit as they benefit from imported technologies in the early stages of economic take-off, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. In addition, the Chinese economy faces serious obstacles of transition from inefficient state owned enterprises, a shaky financial system, and inadequate infrastructure. Growing inequality, massive internal migration, an inadequate social safety net, corruption and weak institutions could foster political instability. Creating a rule of law and institutions for political participation has lagged behind the economy. Indeed, some observers fear instability caused by a weak rather than a rising China. A China that cannot control flows of migration, environmental effects on the global climate, and internal conflict poses another set of problems. Politics has a way of confounding economic projections.

As long as China’s economy does grow, it is likely that its military power will increase, thus making China appear more dangerous to its neighbors and complicating America’s commitments in the region. Taiwan is a case in point. But the balance of military power will also depend on what the United States and other countries will be doing over the next decades. The key to military power in the information age depends on the ability to collect, process, disseminate and integrate complex systems.
of space-based surveillance, high speed computers, and ‘smart’ weapons. China and others will develop some of these capabilities, but according to many military analysts it is not likely that China will soon close that gap with the U.S.

The fact that China is not likely to become a peer competitor to the United States on a global basis does not mean that it could not challenge the United States in East Asia, or that war over Taiwan is not possible. Weaker countries sometimes attack when they feel backed into a corner, such as Japan did at Pearl Harbor or China did when it entered the Korean War in 1950. If, for example, Taiwan were to declare independence, it is likely that China would use force against Taiwan, regardless of the perceived economic or military costs. But it would be unlikely to win such a war, and prudent policy on both sides can make such a war unlikely.

DESIGNING A STRATEGY TO FIT THE CHALLENGE

We faced these problems a decade ago when the Clinton Administration formulated our strategy for East Asia. We knew that hawks who called for containment of China would not be able to rally other countries to that cause. We also knew that if we treated China as an enemy, we were ensuring future enmity. While we could not be sure how China would evolve, it made no sense to foreclose the prospect of a better future. Our response combined realism and liberalism: balance of power and economic integration. We reinforced the U.S.-Japan alliance so that China could not play a “Japan card” against us, while inviting China to join the World Trade Organization and other international institutions. In a rare case of bipartisan comity, the Bush Administration continued that strategy. Nonetheless, there are many in the administration and in the Congress who dislike this strategy. The domestic politics of America’s China policy might be summarized as the left and the right against the center.

China is now our third largest trade partner and second largest official creditor. Critics contend that this trade with China has made us vulnerable. China could hurt us by dumping its holdings of dollars, but to do so would also damage its own economy. The yuan may be undervalued, but China accounts for only a third of the increase in America’s trade deficit over the past five years, and a revaluation will not remove our deficit. As for jobs, even if America bars low cost goods from China, we will import them from somewhere else. To solve our economic problems, we must get our own house in order by raising savings, cutting
deficits, and improving our basic education. That will do more to make America safe than exaggerating China’s economic threat.

China’s internal evolution remains uncertain. It has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since 1990, but another 400 million live on less that $2 per day. It has enormous inequality, a migrant labor force of 140 million, severe pollution and rampant corruption. Political evolution has failed to match economic progress. While more Chinese are free today than ever before in Chinese history, China is far from free. Some 110 million Chinese use the internet, but the government censors it. The danger is that party leaders, trying to counter the erosion of communism, will use nationalism as their ideological glue, and this could lead to an unstable foreign policy.

Faced with such uncertainty, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has engaged China in a strategic dialogue to encourage it to evolve as a “responsible stakeholder”, i.e., to see itself as helping to provide international public goods rather than just pursue its short run self interest. There are some signs of an evolution of Chinese attitudes in this direction, but there is always a residual danger that China will slip into competitive nationalism in the face of its domestic problems. We can make America safe by taking a clue from Ronald Reagan’s phrase “trust but verify.” For China, our slogan should be “embrace, but hedge.” We have had such a strategy for the past decade, and it seems to be working.

CONCLUSION

There is no need for the United States and China to go to war in this century. Not every rising power leads to war—witness America overtaking Britain at the end of the 19th century. And if China’s rise remains peaceful, it promises great benefits to Chinese, its neighbors, and to Americans. But remembering Thucydides’ advice, it will be important for security analysts not to mistake their simple theories for reality, to avoid misleading historical analogies (like the one to Germany), and to avoid letting exaggerated fears create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Or to paraphrase another American president, we can make Americans safer by being wary of fear itself.

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China’s trade surplus with the United States ($202 billion in 2005), its rapid overall economic expansion, and its growing appetite for energy have made China’s growth a salient issue for average Americans. While the facts of Chinese growth are indisputable, the causes and ramifications of that growth story are anything but. For many Americans, though, the story is straightforward—China is winning the game of globalization because it is playing by a different set of rules from us, and its gains are coming at our expense. From this perspective, the only real question is whether we should do anything about it. Do we stand up to China—whether with regard to trade issues, foreign exchange valuation, intellectual property rights protection, etc.—or do we let the situation ride while we deal with other international problems? The problem is that while this sort of framing has a certain gut appeal, it is based on faulty assumptions—faulty assumptions about not only the Chinese economy, but also our own. Such assumptions, if left uncorrected, will lead to policies that over the long run will prove detrimental to American geopolitical and economic interests.

THE GLOBALIZATION REVOLUTION

China’s economic rise, unlike Japan’s a generation ago, is taking place amidst revolutionary changes in the way production takes place. The physical products we consume on a daily basis are being made in ways they were never being made before—through international production chains involving myriad corporate actors, firms bearing a wide variety of
national flags of origin, and firms operating across a host of geographic locales. Geographically, China has become a key node in these chains, a shop floor for manufacturing activities. Yet, who actually benefits—which countries, which companies, and which stakeholders—is a much trickier question, one arguably as perplexing to Chinese policy makers as to our own. It is certainly worth noting that just as Americans feel that we are losing the globalization game (i.e., jobs in manufacturing are disappearing, high value economic activities seem to be moving abroad, foreign firms seem to be encroaching on our daily lives, etc.), many Chinese too feel that they are losing, and often for the same reasons. The sections below will explain why.

THE COMPLEXITY OF CHINA’S TRADE RELATIONS

China today is running substantial trade surpluses with two main global markets: North America and Western Europe. Simultaneously, China (unlike Japan in the 1980s) is running substantial trade deficits with other key parts of the world, most notably East and Southeast Asia. China currently runs trade deficits with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and virtually every Southeast Asian nation, a fact that says a great deal about internationalized production chains. Many products that we in the United States view as “made in China” are only assembled in China, but are composed of parts—often high value parts—that are manufactured outside China and imported into the country for final assembly. In personal computer production, for example, the product gets booked as a Chinese export, but 60–85% of the profits go to American firms (software, integrated circuit design, branding), 10–35% to Taiwanese, Singaporean, or Korean component and ODM (original design manufacturer) firms, and 5% to Chinese assemblers. When Americans see a “made in China” computer, they rue their nation’s economic demise. When Chinese see a “made in China” computer, they see Intel inside (processors), Samsung inside (screens), and Microsoft inside (operating software), and rue their nation’s inability to compete globally.

This partly explains why despite its “global shop floor” status, China, relative to the United States, accounts for such a small portion of global production in terms of value. In 1990, Japan accounted for 22.5 percent of global production, the U.S. 20.7 percent, and China 2.2 percent. By 2003, the United States had grown to 23.3 percent (the world leader), Japan was at 18.1 percent, and China at 6.6 percent.
Globalized production chains make for complicated issues of national economic interest. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia—all net exporters to China—hardly sympathize when major net importers from China, namely the United States, complain about Chinese trade practices. Similarly at the corporate level, firms producing the high-value guts of Chinese-assembled products (the software, the processors, the software, etc.) or the capital-intensive machines driving Chinese industrialization (the construction equipment, the high-end looms and textile production equipment, the semiconductor assembly equipment) are also unreceptive to concerns about China’s rise. Even on such issues as intellectual property rights protection, despite repeated and justifiable U.S. Department of Commerce complaints about IPR violations in China, major victims of such piracy—firms like Microsoft, IBM, and Hewlett Packard—have been unwilling to bring cases to the WTO.

THE COMPLEXITY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, OWNERSHIP, AND CONTROL IN CHINA

The situation is made more complex by ownership patterns within China-based industry. Again unlike Japan in the previous generation, China has been open to foreign direct investment (whether through foreign equity investment in Chinese companies or wholly-foreign owned companies/subsidiaries based in China). Today, the bulk of export-oriented manufacturing in China, particularly at the higher end, is performed by foreign-invested or wholly foreign-owned entities (be they Taiwanese, Japanese, American, German, etc.). In 2004, 57 percent of all Chinese exports were produced by foreign-invested firms. In 2003, 85 percent of all high-tech exports from China were booked by such firms.

Worth noting is the complexity (and degree of foreign participation) in the stakeholder relationships surrounding “made in China” products or Chinese corporate strategy. Such cross-border, multi-faceted relationships now extend even into China’s strategic industries, including areas like oil and gas. When the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) attempted to acquire UNOCAL in the summer of 2005 (for $18.5 billion), more than two-thirds of the financing for that bid was provided not by the Chinese government, but by Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, firms that also happened to provide substantial overall guidance, advisory support, and encouragement to the Chinese client. Meanwhile, legal counsel was provided by Davis Polk, and lobbying support by Aiken...
Gump. The point is not there is anything nefarious about these interactions (indeed, one might argue it is a good thing that formerly closed-off Chinese firms are being infiltrated and influenced by practitioners of global best-practice). Instead, the point is that one should be skeptical about arguments attaching clear-cut “flags of origin” on commercial interactions, whether in terms of “made in China” products or “Chinese” efforts to secure “American” assets. Similarly, one should be skeptical about assertions that the actions of ostensibly Chinese firms—like CNOOC—are either dictated by the Chinese government or part and parcel of Chinese state geostrategy.

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STORY IN CHINA

Globalized production also makes for complicated, often ambiguous societal outcomes, whether in the U.S. or China. Americans today express concerns about the decline of manufacturing jobs (and the benefits traditionally attached to such jobs), a decline that has been going on for five decades (manufacturing employment in the U.S. stood at 35 percent of the total in 1950, and 13 percent in 2004).

The interesting thing is that comparable phenomena are observable in China, albeit at China’s substantially lower level of per capita income (according to World Bank estimates, China’s per capita income in 2004 was $1500, compared to $6790 for Mexico, and $41,440 for the United States). During the first fifteen years of China’s economic reforms, manufacturing jobs rose absolutely and also as a percent of total employment. By 1995, however, manufacturing jobs, which then stood at 98 million, began to decline, both absolutely and relatively. By 2001, they were down to 80.8 million. Several things were happening. First, the bulk of new job creation in the Chinese economy shifted to the service sector, namely construction and transportation. These are generally temporary jobs, devoid of benefits and performed by migrants moving from the countryside into cities. Second, the manufacturing jobs that remain have been stripped of the extensive benefits traditionally associated with socialism. Lifetime employment, guaranteed housing, free healthcare, and extensive pension programs are all for the most part gone.

This makes for tough life prospects for many Chinese citizens. Per capita income is undoubtedly up, in large part because the nation is undergoing a basic industrial revolution. For large parts of the population, extreme poverty associated with agrarian life has been replaced by
a somewhat wealthier, albeit highly tenuous semi-urbanized existence. Meanwhile, along the coast, clusters of real wealth can be found in cities like Shanghai, a municipality whose local per capita income is now on par with Portugal’s. Across the country, we witness rapidly growing disparities of wealth, levels—though notoriously difficult to measure—far outstripping the United States, and now approaching those of Ethiopia and India.

Key to remember is that such disparities have developed in the context of a massive shift nationally, by default, to fee-for-service provision of basic public goods like healthcare and education. In China today, if you want healthcare, you generally have to pay cash for it. The same is true for education. In both cases, Chinese law guarantees free provision, but actual provision in practice is an entirely different story.

THE GOVERNANCE STORY IN CHINA

That the reality of public goods provision diverges so far from stipulated legal requirements has a great deal to do with the way China is governed.

Governance in China has several characteristics. First, while the state bureaucracy is extensive, it is also highly decentralized and fragmented. National policies emerge through a highly informal process. Vague policy “directions” emanate from the center, but those policies get both defined and implemented by local-level (provincial, county, municipal) officials. Indeed, reform has moved forward through frequent instances of local “experimentation,” localized practices that often directly contravene formal central rules. When experiments prove successful, they may get propagated regionally and even nationally, all the while remaining technically in contravention of existing law. If success continues, only then does the experiment become legitimized as official policy and the existing laws amended to reflect reality. In practice, this means that within a single national system of rules and regulations, multiple—and often contradictory—local institutional systems operate simultaneously.

Second, complicating this pattern is the blurring of boundaries between the commercial and governmental sectors. Over the past two decades, the basic governance norm throughout the system—the glue holding the system together, and the clearest signal flowing downward to local officials—is that virtually any action is permissible so long as it results in economic growth. Many local officials have interpreted this not just as a mandate to foster business, but also as a mandate to go into
business. Examples abound, but the point is that Chinese entrepre-
neurs—capitalists, in essence—simultaneously wear a variety of “hats,”
a commercial one, an investor one, and a governmental/regulatory one.
When private entrepreneurs, for example, choose to locate in a particu-
lar city, they frequently do so because land is given to them for free by
the municipal government. The municipality often acquires that land by
forcibly removing and relocating (in violation of national rules) farming
households. The municipality grows economically, local officials take a
shadow equity position in the firm (receiving compensation accord-
ingly), the entrepreneur thrives, the peasant suffers, and the central gov-
ernment scrambles to address the socio-political dislocation that results.

What we witness in China now is not so much “China, Inc.”—a
national business system adroitly managed by a clear governmental hier-
archy with a clear strategy—but instead a type of “government in busi-
ness, government as business” model. Local governments are making the
rules at the same time they are deeply involved in commercial affairs.
Meanwhile, they end up doing very little of what government is sup-
pposed to do (and what the central government wished they would do),
which is to provide public goods (whether in form of tangibles like
healthcare or education, or intangibles like fair enforcement of rules).

Even in something as strategic as the energy sector, we can see the
results. In the electricity sector, China’s total national generating capac-
ity amounts today to approximately 500 gigawatts (GW). Yet, central
officials estimate that approximately 110 GW of that capacity is “ille-
gal,” pertaining to power plants that have been built (often with local
governmental investment) but that never received required central
approvals. The point is not that these plants are hidden, but instead that
they do not generally comply with centrally-mandated engineering stan-
dards, environmental controls, or technical requirements. In such a rap-
idly growing environment, it is the Chinese corporate entities (often with
foreign advisory partners and investors) and Chinese local governmental
investors who end up making de facto policy through fait accompli
infrastructure projects. Central officials, meanwhile, continually play
catch up, scrambling not just to regulate, but also simply to access infor-
mation about what actually is happening on the ground. Many of us in
the United States find China’s growth—and the ramifications of such
growth for the global commons—headspinning. More interesting, so too
do many of the Chinese central officials as they try to govern this highly
diversified, fragmented, and wildly commercialized system.
SO WHAT? RAMIFICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLITICS AND NATIONAL POLICY

Two main “take away” points emerge from this analysis of China. First, on the American electoral front, politicians should be cautious about playing the “China economic threat” card. Decrying “Chinese” currency manipulations, “Chinese” lobbying, “Chinese” IPR violations, and “Chinese” asset grabs may seem viscerally appealing for rallying voter support. The problem, however, is that many of the actions described as “Chinese” often involve substantial American stakeholders: investors, corporate partners, suppliers, etc. Their support for China bashing will prove tepid at best. More broadly, increasingly large portions of the American population are benefiting indirectly from “made in China” production (through cheap products, low interest rates fostered by Chinese investment in the U.S., or service-sector jobs related to the production of “made in China” products). Given these complicated groupings of interests, bashing China is no longer a low-risk, low-cost political strategy.

Second, and far more important, political leaders should be wary of the risks to American national interest of miscasting China’s economic rise. Managing China’s emergence is arguably the most challenging imperative of the 21st century. The rapidity of China’s growth and the sheer size of the Chinese economy mean that China’s economic activities now impact global sustainability across many dimensions: economic, geopolitical, technological, and environmental. Actions that alleviate pressures along one dimension often exacerbate pressures along another (for example, shifts in China from the burning of domestically-plentiful coal to domestically-scarce natural gas are good for the global environment, but problematic for international geopolitics and resource competition). The point is that by miscasting China as overly unified, coherent, mercantilist, and geostrategic—in effect, by interpreting economic outcomes we do not like as products of Chinese strategic intent—we risk failing to identify areas in which our respective interests actually overlap (for example, as major energy-consuming nations), or where Chinese officials are as eager as we are to address the Chinese outcomes we find objectionable (for example, in the environmental area, or even in the area of currency valuation). In short, we risk missing opportunities to cooperate while at the same time creating conflict where none is foreordained.

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A NEW AMERICAN POLICY: SUMMARY

What foreign policy should the United States adopt in the post-9/11 era? The balance-of-power concerns that shaped U.S. foreign policy during 1917–1991 have faded sharply. The nuclear revolution has made conquest among great powers impossible.

As a result other great powers now pose far less threat to U.S. national security than in the past. At the same time a grave new threat to the security of all major powers has arisen: terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This threat stems from two phenomena: the spread of WMD materials and technology, and the rise of terrorist groups that aspire to mass killing.

Threats to the global commons, especially global warming and threats to global public health, also seem increasingly serious.

These new dangers—the WMD terror danger and threats to the global commons—pose a common threat to all major powers. And they cannot be defeated without common action by the major powers.

Three policies are called for:

• The world’s major powers should organize themselves into a new concert—along lines of the 1815 Concert of Europe—to take united action against WMD proliferation, terrorism, and threats to the global commons. The U.S. should lead in creating and sustaining this new concert.
• The U.S. should reorient its national security policies and programs toward counterterror and countering WMD spread, while downgrading efforts to prepare for war against other major powers.

• Programs to protect the environment and global public health should be given higher priority in U.S. foreign policy making.

**AMERICAN STRATEGY, 1917–1991: KEEP EURASIA DIVIDED**

During 1917–1991 American national security policy focused on maintaining the political division of industrial Eurasia. American policy makers feared that any state that controlled all of Eurasia could exploit its economic resources to build a war machine that could project power across the Atlantic and threaten the United States. Hence the U.S. persistently opposed the expansion of the lead candidates for Eurasian hegemony, Germany and the Soviet Union. Specifically, the U.S. fought bitter wars to contain Germany during 1917–18 and 1941–45 and waged a long cold war to contain the Soviet Union during 1947–1991.

Terrorism was not considered a significant threat to the United States during 1917–1991. Very little terror was directed against the U.S. during these years. After 1945 nuclear proliferation was considered a worry but was subordinate to geopolitical concerns.

Threats to the global commons seemed remote. The global climate seemed unthreatened. U.S. public health was seen as unconnected to wider global public health.

**THE FADING OF GEOPOLITICAL THREATS AFTER 1991**

The danger that a Eurasian hegemon might appear and threaten the U.S. has largely disappeared since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

There is no plausible candidate for Eurasian hegemony now on the horizon. China comes closest, but not very close. Someday China may rival the United States in military power but that day is decades away.¹ And even then China will pose little geopolitical threat to the U.S. for three reasons.

• If China does someday rival the U.S. in military power, geography will make it a markedly less plausible candidate for Eurasian hegemony than was Germany in 1917 and 1941. Unlike Germany, China
is not adjacent to large, vulnerable industrial regions. China therefore does not have targets within easy reach. To conquer Japan, the biggest prize in the region, China must cross a vast water barrier.

- If China nevertheless does somehow conquer other industrial states it will gain little strength by doing so. This is because post-industrial knowledge-based economies are far harder for a conqueror to harness to aggressive purposes than the smokestack economies of the 1940s and 1950s. Post-industrial economies depend on free access to technical and social information. This access requires some domestic press freedom and access to the internet, foreign publications, and foreign travel. But the police measures needed to subdue a conquered society require that these channels be controlled because they also serve as carriers of subversive ideas. Thus key elements of the economic fabric now must be ripped out to maintain control over conquered polities. This is a marked change from the smokestack-economy era, when societies could be conquered and policed with far less collateral harm to their economies. The assumption that underlay old geopolitical thinking, that conquered economies could be harnessed to build up the war machines of their conquerors, is no longer true.

- The nuclear revolution makes great powers virtually unconquerable. Any state with a secure nuclear deterrent is secure from conquest, as its attacker would face annihilation. And a secure deterrent is far easier to maintain than to threaten, so nuclear powers can defend themselves even against states with many times their economic power. As a result the U.S. could defend itself against China even if it greatly grew its economy, then conquered its neighbors, and then found a way to harness their industrial power for war. Under such exceedingly far-fetched circumstances China still could not conquer the U.S. without first developing a nuclear first-strike capability against the U.S. This is a pipedream and will remain so. It would require an implausibly overwhelming Chinese economic superiority over the U.S.

For these reasons geopolitical threats should have far less priority in U.S. national security policy than they have held in the past. Other major powers are not the danger to U.S. security they once were.
THREE NEW DANGERS: WMD SPREAD, WMD TERRORISTS, THREATS TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS

As geopolitical threats have faded three dangerous new threats have emerged.

**WMD Proliferation.** Global security of nuclear weapons and materials has seen major crumbling in recent years.

- The Soviet collapse made Soviet nuclear weapons, materials, and scientists more available to terrorists.
- The advance and spread of technology is lowering the cost of developing WMD. Even poor states like North Korea can now afford it.
- New nuclear proliferators have appeared on the scene. In the early 1990s we saw large counter-proliferation successes: South Africa abandoned the bomb, Argentina and Brazil dropped their nuclear programs, and Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus dismantled their Soviet-legacy nuclear arsenals. Momentum seemed to be with the non-proliferation regime. More recently things have ominously reversed. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, and Iran has moved further to develop them. Pakistan’s nuclear technology has been spread to others by the renegade leader of the Pakistani nuclear program, A.Q. Kahn.

**WMD Terrorists.** A new breed of terrorists who aspire to mass killing has appeared. The 1990s saw for the first time the emergence of terrorist groups—the Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo (1994/95) and al-Qaeda (1990)—that aspire to mass killing and would use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction if they had them.

Before the 1990s students of terror assumed that no terrorists aspired to commit mass murder. The watchword was that “terrorists want a lot of people watching not a lot of people dead.” Terrorists were assumed to be operating in the realm of pragmatic politics in pursuit of defined political aims.

The appearance of Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda proved this assumption wrong; some terror groups aspire to vast destruction. In 1998 Osama Bin Laden proclaimed that “to kill Americans . . . civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible.”

A former al-Qaeda press
spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, even claimed that al-Qaeda had a right to kill four million Americans, including two million children.3

Together these developments face the United States with a serious threat of nuclear terrorism.

**Emerging dangers to the “global commons”—to common interests including the global climate and public health.** If unchecked, climate change could wreak large damage to civilization. This danger threatens a common human possession, the global climate. Others common threats include the spreading H5N1 avian flu virus, other emerging infectious diseases, and emerging anti-biotic-resistant infectious diseases. These dangers seem minor—until they arrive. (The 1918 flu epidemic killed 675,000 Americans, more than both world wars combined.) They pose a common threat because they will ignore borders and threaten everyone if they develop. The danger they pose is growing with growing interaction between the human and animal world, and with irresponsible use of medicine.

Climate change and emerging infectious disease pose common problems that must be addressed in common with other states. Unilateral action by individual states will not be enough.

**AN AMERICAN STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE NEW THREATS**

A U.S. strategy to counter these new threats—WMD terror and threats to the global commons—should have three elements.

Create and sustain a concert of cooperation among the world’s major powers. In 1815 the victorious powers that had defeated Napoleon created a Concert of Europe to address the continuing danger of mass revolution, which they saw as a threat to them all. Under the Concert they agreed to cooperate to repress revolution wherever it appeared while also limiting conflicts among themselves.

Today the world again faces a threat from below, this time from terrorists. The world also faces other common threats, especially to the climate and to global public health. Again a concert among the major powers is required to address these shared dangers.

A concert is both possible and necessary. A concert is possible because the major states pose little threat to each other—far less than before the nuclear revolution. As noted above, nuclear weapons have
made conquest among major powers almost impossible. As a result the competition for security that fueled much conflict among great powers in the past has greatly abated. Nuclear weapons have freed the major powers to cooperate against other dangers. Because the powers are less dangerous to each other they can more easily make common cause to solve other problems.

A concert is also possible because all major powers are threatened by WMD terror and by threats to climate and health. All major powers therefore have an interest in defeating these threats, so all have an interest in cooperating against these threats. None will be tempted to say, “those problems threaten you, not us, so we won’t help,” because they threaten everyone. All will be inclined to cooperate as long as they understand this.

A concert is necessary because WMD proliferation cannot be contained and terror cannot be defeated without common action by the world’s great powers. Nor can the climate be protected or global health be preserved by unilateral action by one country.

Counter-terror policy is only as strong as its weakest link. If terrorist groups find haven anywhere, as they did in Afghanistan in the 1990s, they can flourish. Every door must be shut to them, every haven denied. This requires broad-front cooperation by all the world’s major states. There can be no defectors. If any major states defect from the global counter-terror effort, the terrorists can find the haven they need by playing one power against another. The only way to avoid this is for the U.S. to forge a concert and relentlessly maintain it by leading it forward.

Common action is also required to protect the climate and health. No state can protect itself by its unilateral action from the harmful effects of fossil-fuel burning by other countries. No state can fully protect itself from pandemic diseases that emerge from other societies. Instead a key defense against pandemic lies in collective public health measures to prevent the emergence of pandemic disease wherever that might occur.

Other U.S. policies should be subordinated to the need to create and maintain the new major-power concert.

Most important, the U.S.-China rivalry must be kept within bounds so that Chinese-American cooperation against proliferation and terror is maintained.

As noted above, China will likely rise in relative power for some years, perhaps becoming a peer competitor to the U.S. someday. A major
power shift is underway. History warns that the two strongest powers often clash, as each is the main threat to the other. History further warns that power transitions are dangerous and hard to manage.

If China’s rise is mismanaged the danger of a U.S.-China cold war, or even a hot war, will arise. Such conflicts would spell disruption of U.S.-China cooperation against WMD terror and other common threats. Such disruption would pose a grave threat to U.S. and global security. Instead the U.S. must manage China’s rise in a way that maintains U.S.-Chinese cooperation against these common threats. The U.S. must achieve its prime traditional geopolitical goal—preventing the emergence of a hegemonic Eurasian superstate—in a way that allows it to achieve its newer goals as well.

Building and preserving a concert will also require a buildup of U.S. diplomatic skills, and a rebuilding of American standing in the world. American statecraft skills have atrophied in recent years as the State Department has been poorly funded. American standing around the world has plummeted as publics and elites have reacted in allergic fashion to the policies and rhetoric of the Bush administration. Rebuilding American standing will require effective U.S. public diplomacy and a new approach to foreign policy—above all a more respectful tone from U.S. leaders, and full U.S. consultation with other governments before taking important action. The Bush administration has often left other governments feeling unconsulted or disrespected. It has provoked resentment by taking a bullying tone with others. Some in the conservative movement have further raised eyebrows by talking of the need for an American empire. The U.S. cannot lead a global concert until these errors are corrected.

Redirect U.S. national security resources toward the new security threat: WMD terror. Declaratory U.S. national security policy should identify the threat of WMD terror as the prime threat to U.S. national security.

U.S. national security programs should also be redirected toward the WMD terror threat. This requires a reallocation of resources away from preparations for war against other great powers and toward the many functions—most of them non-military—that defeating terror and containing the spread of WMD requires. These functions include:

- Public diplomacy to shape global opinion on terror-related issues and toward the United States.
• Efforts to lock down loose nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and elsewhere.
• Preventing or ending civil and interstate warfare around the world. This task is important because terrorist organizations feed on war- fare. For example, al-Qaeda exploits the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, the conflict in Iraq, the con- flict in Chechnya, and past conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Somalia in its propaganda, and it uses some of these conflicts as a training ground for its terrorists. Hence the U.S. should be a peace- maker everywhere. To do this it must develop its peacemaking capacity.
• Preventing failed states and ameliorating state failure. Terrorists breed in failed states, hence the U.S. must build its capacity to pre- vent them and ameliorate them.
• Strengthening all elements of homeland security. This should include reform of the FBI, integrating local police, fire departments, and public health labs into homeland security, imposing better control on U.S. borders, securing U.S. nuclear reactors, chemical plants, rail- roads and ports from terrorist attack, and rewriting U.S. insurance laws governing terrorist incidents to give businesses an incentive to harden their infrastructure against an attack.

Elevate the protection of the global environment and global public health to higher priority in U.S. foreign policy. These goals are viewed as minor concerns in U.S. foreign policymaking. They deserve far higher priority, commensurate with their importance to the national welfare.

CONCLUSIONS

Never in modern times have the world’s major powers had less reason to compete with each other or more reason to cooperate to solve problems that commonly threaten them all. Current conditions resembles the con- dition of 1815, when all the major powers felt endangered by a common threat from below—mass revolution—and cooperated against it. Today the world’s major powers again are jointly threatened by a threat from below—WMD terror—and by threats to their shared climate and global public health that they must address together. These challenges threaten the world in collective fashion and cannot be solved by the unilateral
action of a single power. It is therefore both possible and necessary for the world’s major states to cooperate to address these problems.

Accordingly, the U.S should lead in developing and sustaining a broad cooperation against these common problems. It should also reorient its foreign and security policy to address them. These policies are the best path to making America safer.

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NOTES

1. Developing this point are the chapters by Joseph Nye and Edward Steinfield in this volume.


4. A recent survey of global views of the United States is “America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006, retrieved from http://pewglobal.org/ reports/display.php?ReportID=252. This survey reports that favorable opinions of the United States have fallen sharply since 1999/2000 and are at new lows in some important countries. Specifically, during the period 1999/2000–2006 favorable views of the U.S. fell from 83 percent to 56 percent in Britain, 62 percent to 39 percent in France, 78 percent to 37 percent in Germany, and 75 percent to 30 percent in Indonesia.

5. In 2003 Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria wrote: “Having traveled the world and met with senior government officials in dozens of countries over the past year, I can report that with the exception of Britain and Israel, every country the administration has dealt with feels humiliated by it.” Fareed Zakaria, “The Arrogant Empire,” Newsweek, March 24, 2003. Jorge Castañeda, Mexico’s reformist foreign minister until January, 2003, said of Latin American officials: “We like and understand America. But we find it extremely irritating to be treated with utter contempt.” (Ibid.) A retired senior Turkish diplomat, Ozdem Sanberk, remarked that U.S. abrasiveness helped prevent Turkish support for the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq: “The way the U.S. has been conducting the negotiations has been, in general, humiliating.” (Ibid.)